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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF ARMED CONFLICT
by
Anton Parlow
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Scott Adams, Ph.D.
This dissertation consists of three essays on the economic cost of armed conflict.
The first essay focuses on the impact of an armed conflict on children’s health.
The exposure to violence in utero and early in life has adverse impacts on chil-
dren’s age-adjusted height. Using the experience of the Kashmir insurgency,
I find that children more affected by the insurgency are 0.9 to 1.4 standard
deviations shorter compared with children less affected by the insurgency. The
effect is larger for children born during peaks in violence. Also, children affected
by the insurgency are more likely to be sick in the two weeks prior to the survey.
The second essay analyzes the effect of an armed conflict on education of women.
Armed conflicts tend to reduce educational outcomes of groups more affected
by violence compared with groups less affected by violence. The Kashmir insur-
gency is different from previous examples that I find an insignificant effect of the
insurgency on years of schooling. There are two reasons for this finding. First,
improvements in the educational sector in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in
the 1980s and 1990s continue to work during the insurgency. Second, the Indian
government dealt with the insurgency by sending in tens of thousands security
forces to break down any form of rebellion.
The third essay explores the relationship between (armed) conflict and trade.
Modeling the world as n*n dyadic country relationships, I account for het-
ii
erogeneity of conflict dyads over time using panel estimation techniques and
estimate the relationship between trade and conflict. The simultaneity in the
trade-peace relationships is solved by using an instrumental variable approach.
I find in most setups that trade promotes peace. After accounting for endo-
geneity, however, the relationship between trade and conflict reverses in sign in
some setups, but remains negative once focusing only on bilateral conflict with
actual battle deaths.
iii
This dissertation is dedicated to every first generation college student coming
from a low-income and blue-collar household.
iv
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1Chapter 1
Armed Conflict and
Children’s Health: The case
of Kashmir
1.1 Introduction
Children exposed to negative external shocks in utero, or early in life, have
higher mortality rates, lower birth weights and are shorter for their age. These
shocks can include recessions (Cutler et al. 2002), famines (Stein et al. 1975,
Almond et al. 2008), droughts (Akresh and Verwimp 2006), pandemics (Almond
2006), wildfires (Jayachandran 2008), or radioactive fallout (Almond, Edlund
and Palme 2009, Danzer and Danzer 2011)
A new dimension to these external shocks is armed conflict. The impacts
of armed conflicts on human capital formation have been in the focus of empir-
ical research since the mid 2000s. This includes education (Shemyakina 2011,
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Akbulut-Yuksel 2009, Swee 2009), displacement (Deininger et al. 2004), labor
force participation (Menon and van der Meulen 2010) and the two main predic-
tors of health later in life: low birth weight (Camacho 2009) and height early
in life (Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh 2009, Guerrero-Serdan 2009, Akresh,
Lucchetti and Thirumurthy 2010, Akresh and Verwimp 2011). Through stresses
experienced in utero and early in life because of an armed conflict, the height
development of children is negatively affected. Children who experienced more
violence early in life than other children are shorter for their age.
Most of this research explored the negative effects of civil wars and interstate
wars on health. Here, I focus on a less violent form of an armed conflict: an
insurgency. The Kashmir insurgency in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
is an ongoing conflict which started in 1990. The insurgency has three distinct
phases, making it possible to identify treatment and control groups by their
geographical as well as cohort exposure.
In this study, I utilize the National Family Health Survey for India (NFHS)
to identify the effects of the insurgency on children’s height for age z-scores
(HAZ). To estimate the (local) average treatment effect on the height of children
age 0 to 36 months, I combine event data on violence with the location of a
household during the insurgency. The treated children experienced violence in
utero and in their first years of life. In the districts and regions more affected
by the insurgency, I find negative effects on height for age z-scores. Children
more affected by the insurgency are 0.9 to 1.4 standard deviations shorter than
children less affected by the insurgency.
The implications of lower height are well-known, with much evidence sug-
gesting poorer education and labor market outcomes for those in developing
and developed countries (Currie and Madrian 1999, Strauss and Thomas 2008,
Victora et al. 2008). Examples for developing countries include delayed school
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enrollment in Ghana (Glewwe and Jacoby 1995) or lower test results in rural
India (Monk and Kingdon 2009).
In addition to height, I briefly explore whether conflict affects another impor-
tant determinant of health in developing countries. Specifically, I test whether
more conflict-exposed children are also more likely to have diarrhea in the two
weeks prior to the survey interview. Children already shorter for their age are
indeed more likely to show symptoms of diarrhea.
My research is novel as the Kashmir insurgency is embedded in the conflict
between India and Pakistan over the territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
Different geopolitical interests are the reason that research based on households
living in this region is very limited. The overall picture drawn in official Census
reports and health survey reports is a positive one about trends in the state
of J&K. This may be true for the entire state of J&K, but focusing on differ-
ent groups within the state reveal poorer health and education (Parlow 2012)
associated with the armed conflict in J&K.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces to the literature.
Section 3 briefly describes the phases of the Kashmir insurgency and the iden-
tification strategy. Section 4 discusses the data and my empirical strategy.
Results are discussed in section 5. In section 6, I present robustness checks and
briefly explore some additional results on the long term impacts of conflict on
children’s health. The paper concludes in section 7.
1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 Health and external shocks
Detailed literature reviews on the effects of external shocks on infant health can
be found in Currie and Madrian (1999), Strauss and Thomas (2008), Victora et
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al. (2008), and Almond and Currie (2010).1
Although the links between childhood health and external shocks are mani-
fold,2 the consensus is that fetal health and the environment in the first 36 (to
59) months of life determine future health outcomes. This paper is also related
to the idea of in utero programming, which can be traced back to Barker (1998)
and his focus on birth weight. Gluckman and Mark (2004) suggest a life-course
model where the combination of in utero health and early life conditions work
together. Thus, birth weight and height can be linked (Luo et al. 1998, Finken
et al. 2006).
Conceptually, I consider health shocks in the context of a health production
function. Health (H) is modeled as a function of mother characteristics (X),
household characteristics (e.g. social economic status (SES), access to health
services and external shocks). Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) introduce the idea
of estimating a health production function with H=f(X, SES, health services).
In the context of life-course models, health will also be a function of previous
health and of shocks.
Health production functions are widely estimated in the public health liter-
ature, but not as much in the development literature. Children’s height is often
the focus of the development economics literature because it directly relates to
malnutrition, a persistent problem in developing countries (Akresh and Verwimp
2011). My goal is to estimate children’s height as a function of the experience of
violence early in life, mother’s and household’s characteristics, children’s health
at birth, and health service utilization during pregnancy.
1These shocks can include famines, droughts, recessions, pandemics, and smog.
2These links can include lack of micro nutrients, stress during pregnancy, infections early
in life, mother’s characteristics, household wealth and more.
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1.2.2 Armed conflicts and health
The particular external shock studied in this paper is armed conflict. Dur-
ing such conflicts, the access to health services for pregnant women, including
vaccinations, prenatal and antenatal care, and micro-nutrients needed for the
fetus development, is limited. Camacho (2007) adds that stress during preg-
nancy is another channel limiting the development of the child in utero. Stress
changes the production and distribution of hormones, including intrauterine
growth hormones. Stress can reduce the gestation time of the fetus. In de-
veloping countries, armed conflict and its corresponding stresses make already
existing challenges to fetal development more acute.
Armed conflict takes different forms depending on the level of violence and
actors involved. They can range from insurgencies to civil wars to wars between
two countries to world wars. Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) estimates the long-term
effects of WW II on the German population. Individuals more affected by allied
bombings during WW II earn less as adults and are also shorter and less satisfied
with their health. Guerrero-Serdan (2009) estimates the regional variation in
height for age z-scores for children in Iraq after the US invasion. Children
in more war-affected regions are shorter. Akresh, Lucchetti and Thirumurthy
(2010) examine the effect of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border war on height of
children. Children close to border regions are shorter in both countries.
Akresh and Verwimp (2011) focus on the civil war in north Rwanda and
the crop failure in south Rwanda. Children born between 1987 and 1991 are
shorter because of these two external shocks. Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh
(2009) find that children in rural Burundi are shorter because of the civil war.
Camacho (2007) again highlights the role of stress, finding that land mine explo-
sions in Colombia between 1998 and 2003 led to lower birth weights and more
prematurely births.
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An example for the impacts of an insurgency on human capital outcomes can
be found in Galdo (2010). He estimates the long-run effects on adult earnings
of the ”Shining Path”-insurgency in Peru (1980 to 1995). He identifies groups
who were in utero, infants or those of pre-school age during the insurgency. As
adults, these individuals earn less in their jobs.
Literature on the effects of the Kashmir insurgency in particular, however, is
limited. Moreover, official Census reports (Census of India 2001, 2011) and those
based on the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) draw a positive picture
for the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir in terms of mortality rates, fertility
and vaccination programs. This positive picture potentially masks important
district or regional variations, making the methodology and results presented in
this paper helpful in understanding the impact of the insurgency on children’s
health.
1.3 The Kashmir insurgency and identification
1.3.1 The Kashmir insurgency
In December 1989, the daughter of the Indian home minister of Kashmir af-
fairs, Rubaiya Sayeed, was kidnapped by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front. India responded, sending in tens of thousands of security force personnel
into the valley of Kashmir in January 1990. This marked the official begin-
ning of the insurgency. Within a short period of time, India stationed a few
hundred thousand security force personnel throughout the valley, with a focus
on major cities. Violence committed against civilians by militants, as well as
security forces inexperienced (and overwhelmed) in fighting militancy, were the
norm early in the 1990s (Joshi 1999, Schofield 2001).3 Furthermore, 75,000 to
3This includes murder, kidnapping, bomb explosions, sexual abuse, and torture by mili-
tants. The literature also cites many examples where civilians were shot during cross-fires,
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100,000 Hindus migrated from the valley of Kashmir in 1990 to camps around
Jammu and New Dehli leaving behind an almost exclusive Muslim population
(Asia Watch 1993). By the mid 1990s, the insurgency became a pro-Pakistan
movement with new militant groups organizing the uprising.4 Violence died out
slowly throughout the cities in the valley. In 2001-2002, there was another peak
in violence as the groups behind the militancy changed again. Their agenda was
fighting a ”Jihad” against India by committing militant acts, not just in J&K
(Meyerle 2008). The various phases of the insurgency and the regional variation
in its intensity allow for an opportunity to identify the effects of the conflict on
groups differently affected by the insurgency.
1.3.2 Identification strategy based on phases of violence
Based on a novel event-dataset constructed from an in-depth literature review
of the insurgency and crime data (INSCR 2012), I identify districts more af-
fected by violence, as well as three distinct phases of the insurgency. Table
1.1 presents the count of insurgency events by time and region. Figure 1.1
shows the districts of J&K. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has three regions:
Jammu, Kashmir and the sparsely populated Laddakh region. The insurgency
was concentrated in the Jammu and Kashmir region only. The Jammu re-
gion itself includes six districts (Jammu, Doda, Udhampur, Kathua, Rajouri
and Poonch). The Kashmir region, also known as the valley of Kashmir, also
includes six districts (Anantnag, Pulwama, Srinagar, Badgam, Baramula and
Kupwara).5 Given the harsh winters in J&K, the state has two capitals. Srina-
gar city is the summer capital, while Jammu city is the winter capital.
adopted and tortured, and in the case of women sexually abused, by security force personnel.
4I will not discuss the role of Pakistan’s involvement in the Kashmir insurgency here. The
reader should note that the insurgency is also embedded in the Indian-Pakistani conflict over
the territory of Jammu and Kashmir resulting in three short wars (1947, 1965, and 1999).
5In 2011 Jammu and Kashmir was reorganized into 22 districts. The NFHS surveys and
my analysis are based on the old district structure.
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[Table 1.1 about here]
[Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 about here]
Figures 1.2-1.4 illustrate the peaks of violence across regions that will underlie
the identification strategy outlined in this section.6
The first phase of the insurgency can be marked from 1990 - 1996. Militancy
focused on urban areas of Kashmir, especially the Srinagar district and the
summer capital Srinagar city. To a lesser extent, the winter capital Jammu
city in the Jammu region was also affected by violence (Table 1.1). Local
government and its agencies, which are targets for militants (or terrorists) in
general (Kalyvas 2006, Justino 2009), are present in the capitals.
The second phase was from 1996 to 2001 with a peak in violence around
2001. Militancy concentration moved away from Srinagar (city) to the smaller
cities of Kashmir and to the districts of Jammu (Doda, Rajouri and Poonch)
located closer to the Line of Control (LoC). This was because of the massive
presence of security force personnel in the urban areas of Kashmir. The LoC also
separates India from Pakistan and most militant infiltration originated there.
During the 2001 peak in violence, Hindus were specifically targeted through
multiple massacres (SATP 2012). Before these massacres, most civilian victims
were Muslims.
The third phase started after the peak in violence in 2001 and can be de-
scribed as a low-intensity conflict with no major incidences against civilians in
Jammu and Kashmir. In some sense the population got used to the presence of
a massive security force (up to 350,000) and the fear of violence. Most victims
6Peaks in violence can be clearly identified around 1995-1996 and 2001-2002. After 2001,
violence died out slowly.
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of the insurgency were actual militants during this period (see Figure 1.2).
1.4 Data and empirical strategy
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, I describe the data I use and general differences in height out-
comes of children living in urban and rural areas of Kashmir.
I utilize the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) for India, a national and
representative household survey, to analyze the effects of the Kashmir insurgency
on children’s height. The NFHS has three individual rounds: NFHS-1 (1993),
NFHS-2 (1998-1999) and NFHS-3 (2005-2006). Women who were ever-married
and aged 15 to 49 years were interviewed. Information on their demographic,
household and health background (mainly utilization of health services) were
collected. Their children, ages 59 months (NFHS-1, NFSH-3) and 36 months
(NFHS-2), were measured in terms of height and weight. The three survey
rounds for J&K cover different phases of the insurgency, with different districts
covered in each because of security reasons. The NFHS-1 was only conducted
in the Jammu region. The NFHS-2 covers the entire Kashmir valley and three
out of six districts in Jammu. The NFHS-3 covers the entire J&K region. The
coverage across survey rounds is sufficient to identify children exposed differently
by the insurgency in utero and early in life.
Table 1.2 summarizes basic descriptive statistics for each NFHS survey
round. Height for age z-scores for children is computed according to the WHO
2006 growth standards. The reference population is children in the same age
group in the United States. Children in J&K are shorter on the average and
close to being stunted.7 The samples of children are n=666 (NFHS-1), n=962
7Stunted is defined as two standard deviations less than the reference population.
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(NFHS-2) and n=1,226 (NFHS-3).
The urban-rural differential in children’s height is typical for developing
countries where health services are more available in urban areas. In rural areas
mothers have less access to health services during and after pregnancy. These
health services can include checkups, access to doctors and micro-nutrients
needed for the development of the child. Access to health services deteriorated
during the 1990s in rural Kashmir. Basic health services could not be delivered
to rural areas because of the violence (Asia Watch 1993), which can explain the
decrease in HAZ scores for the NFHS-2 round (Table 1.2).
[Table 1.2 about here]
Additionally, the developments in height scores described above can be visu-
alized using kernel weighted local polynomial graphs. In developing countries
younger children can have lower HAZ-scores than older children because of im-
provements in health services over time if the development process is not inter-
rupted (WHO 2012).8 To conserve space, I only show urban-rural differentials
for the NFHS-1 and Kashmir-Jammu differentials for the NFHS-2 and 3 (Figure
1.5).
The NFHS-1 only includes the Jammu region. Children in urban areas
have slightly lower HAZ-scores than children in rural areas, which could be at-
tributed to the insurgency. Children in Kashmir are shorter than children in
Jammu using the NFHS-2 sample. Furthermore, the older cohort has slightly
better scores that fall sharply. The trend for the NFHS-3 is mixed. Younger
children in Jammu (up to 24 months) are more affected by the insurgency than
children in Kashmir. One reason could be that Hindus were targets of militants
during 2001-2002. Hindus are concentrated in the Jammu region of the state.
8This means lower in absolute values because they average HAZ score is negative.
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This is because almost the entire Hindu community left the valley after of the
outbreak of the insurgency in 1990.
[Figure 1.5 about here]
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The goal of my paper is to quantify the actual effect of the insurgency on
children’s height. Thus, I will employ a difference in difference technique to
estimate the (local) average treatment effect of the insurgency on the height
of children more affected by violence compared with children less affected by
violence. The Kashmir insurgency, because of its variation in intensity across
regions over time, allows me to divide children into treatment and control groups
in a natural experiment setup. I expect those in conflict-affected regions to
experience violence in utero through stress experienced by the mother, to have
less access to health services in general, and to be exposed to violence early in
life.
My empirical specification is an approximation of a reduced-form health
production function and is written as:
Hijt = α+γwarijt+β1X
child
1ijt +β2X
mother
2ijt +β3X
SES
3ijt +ρj +θt+ δt+ ijt (1.1)
Hijt is the HAZ score of child i living in district or region j and born in year
t.9 The average treatment effect is γ, where war is a binary variable indicating
children born and living in a more conflict-affected region.
X1 is a vector describing children’s characteristics, including age in months,
9The dependent variable is a standardized height score which allows the interpretation of
the war-coefficient directly as a reduction in standard deviations from the reference population.
A one standard deviation difference is approximately 2 cm.
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sex, birth order, and an indicator whether the child was small at birth.10 Birth
size (or birth weight in general) can be linked to height later in life (Luo et al.
1998, Finken et al. 2006). Although children small at birth can catch up in
growth if the environment early in life is optimal, I expect that these children
remain shorter because of the low level of development in J&K.11
The vector X2 contains mother’s characteristics, including age, education
and height in cm. Furthermore, I use information on health service utilization.
Previous research mostly ignored the link between mother’s health and chil-
dren’s health at birth because of the lack of data. Akresh and Verwimp (2011)
use current BMI of the mother to proxy for her health status during pregnancy
and at birth. Although it is possible to assume that current BMI could also
have been the BMI before the pregnancy, I use information on iron-deficiency
anemia. Anemia is a chronic disease known to start during childhood because
of the lack of iron in food (WHO 2012). Iron-deficient mothers have higher
energy requirements during pregnancy which may not be met during an armed
conflict. In addition, I use information on whether the mother ever experienced
a still-birth or had an abortion in the past.12
X3 is a vector describing the socioeconomic status (SES) of the household.
This includes land- and livestock ownership controls, as well as whether one
belongs to a scheduled caste.13 The parameter ρ includes district fixed effects,
and city size effects, common to every child in the district. The parameter θ
includes quarter and year of birth fixed effects. Finally, the parameter δ includes
10The NFHS asks whether the child was smaller than the average at birth. The actual
birth weight would be a more robust measurement, but is only available for a small group of
children.
11J&K is one of the least developed states in India.
12Previous abortions can increase complications in the following pregnancy which in turn
can affect the in utero development of the child. Similarly, a previous still-birth could indicate
complications during pregnancy in general and affect the pregnancy following.
13I do not use information on father’s occupation or education, because HAZ scores are
usually only affected by mother’s characteristics. Another reason is that almost all fathers
work in low-skilled jobs. Note that Jammu and Kashmir is one of the least developed states
in India. Almost everyone works in professions requiring little educational skills.
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state fixed effects for children born at time t. This could help remove the
confounding influence of factors such as the number of hospitals or community
health centers in the region.
1.5 Results for the NFHS-1, 2 and 3
1.5.1 The effect of the insurgency on height
In this section I focus on the quantitative effect of the insurgency on children’s
height. I will discuss other control variables affecting height in the next section.
I present regression results by survey round in Table 1.3 (NFHS-1), Table 1.4
(NFHS-2) and Table 1.5 (NFHS-3).14 Each survey round covers a different
phase of the insurgency and allows me to test if the experience of violence early
in life has a negative impact on different treatment groups. Furthermore, I have
two possible sets of treatment and control groups in mind. First, I compare the
height outcomes of children of the same age group but living in more and less
affected districts (or regions) of J&K. Second, I compare children living in the
same district (or region) but belonging to a different age group (cohort models).
In developing countries younger children can have better height outcomes than
older children because of improvements in the health system over time. An
armed conflict can interrupt this development. Thus, I expect children born
at the beginning of the insurgency and around peaks in violence to be more
affected compared to an older cohort born before these shocks. Figure 1.6 il-
lustrates my treatment and control groups by phases of the insurgency and the
corresponding survey rounds of the NFHS.
14The NFHS-1 differs from the NFHS-2 and 3 in one major point. It does not include
anthropometric measurements for the mother or tests of hemoglobin levels. Height of the
mother is one of the main predictors for children’s height and could create an omitted variables
bias.
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[Figure 1.6 about here]
The NFHS-1 covers the first phase of the insurgency. During the first phase
of the insurgency it was only safe to conduct a survey in the Jammu region of
J&K. Most of the violent events in the Jammu region were actually committed
in the Jammu district itself and the winter capital Jammu city. I find that
children living in the Jammu district are up to one standard deviation shorter
than children living in less affected districts of the Jammu region (Table 1.3).
I also compare the height outcome of children born before the outbreak of the
insurgency with children born after 1990. The two age cohorts live in the same
district (cohort models). Children born after the outbreak of the insurgency
loose up to 1.4 standard deviations compared to children born before the out-
break. Although the Jammu district is less affected by militancy compared to
districts in Kashmir during the first phase of the insurgency (Table 1.1), chil-
dren are significantly affected in their height. Joshi (1999) notes that during
1990 public services were interrupted by daily strikes of public servants, which
can affect the delivery of health services. This can explain why I also find a
negative, but smaller in magnitude, effect on height scores of children living in
rural areas of the Jammu district, because health services were not delivered
to rural areas. Furthermore, Schofield (2001) describes many examples where
ambulances and medical delivery trucks were stopped by security forces at check
points and had to return to the district hospital.
[Table 1.3 about here]
For the second phase of the insurgency I use the NFHS-2. My focus is on chil-
dren living in urban Kashmir as the more conflict-affected region. I compare
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their height outcomes with children living in urban Jammu. Given that the
NFHS-2 contains only safe areas of Jammu, these children developed without
being exposed to violence and make an ideal control group.15 I find that children
living in urban areas of Kashmir, excluding Srinagar, are affected the most by
the experience of violence (Table 1.4).16 These children are up to 2.5 standard
deviations shorter because of the insurgency. Violence moved from the Srinagar
district to other districts in Kashmir, namely Anantnag, Badgam and Kupwara,
because of security force personnel stationed in Srinagar. Most of the violent
events coded for 1996 to 1999 (Table 1.1) were actually committed in these
three districts.
[Table 1.4 about here]
Finally, the NFHS-3 allows me to test if children who were in utero or born
during the 2001 peak in violence are affected by the experience of violence. I
have two treatment groups in mind. First, I want to know if children in Kashmir
(and urban Kashmir) are negatively affected by the insurgency compared to
children in Jammu.17 Second, during the 2001 peak in violence Hindus were
targets of violence. I test if Hindus are negatively affected in their height.
Children in Kashmir are indeed shorter compared to children in Jammu be-
cause of the insurgency (Table 1.5). They are up to 1.5 standard deviations
shorter. After 15 years of insurgency the Kashmir region lags behind the Jammu
15I cannot break down my sample into an older cohort and younger cohort, because only
children up to 36 months were measured in their height in this survey round. I would expect
for instance, that a cohort born in after the end of the first phase the Srinagar district would
have improved HAZ scores compared to an older cohort.
16I also compared HAZ scores for children in Srinagar with safer regions and find that these
could catch up in their growth. Results can be requested.
17The NFHS-3 has no district identifiers. Instead, I will use language spoken to identify
the Kashmir (Kashmiri) and the Jammu region. Kashmiri is almost exclusively spoken in
Kashmir. That is why I cannot break down my sample into districts.
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region in development permanently.18 The insurgency has also a negative, but
less pronounced, impact on Hindus in Jammu (War*Hindu). These children are
up to 0.48 standard deviations shorter compared to Non-Hindus.
[Table 1.5 about here]
Overall, the experience of violence in utero and early in life reduces children
height. For the Kashmir insurgency children are up to 1.4 standard deviations
shorter.
1.5.2 Other Determinants of Height
The NFHS also allows me to test the effect of other variables on height, along
with the external shock. Specifically of interest are children’s health at birth,
mother’s health during pregnancy, and health service utilization. These vari-
ables are included in Tables 1.3-1.5 and warrant some additional discussion.
Health at birth is measured as a dummy variable being small at birth or
not.19 This link can be seen in the context of a life-course model, where birth
size can be used to predict future height outcomes (Luo et al. 1998, Finken et al.
2006). Birth weight would be a more robust measurement to measure children’s
health at birth but birth weight is only available for a very small sample of
children. Furthermore, birth weight is affected by the same in utero experience
as height and could create an endogeneity problem. Though, I do not expect
birth size to be affected by the same experience of violence, because birth size is
typically linked to mother’s birth size (Veena et al. 2004).20 Children, who were
18Even children in rural areas of Kashmir remain shorter compared to children in rural areas
of Jammu. The treatment effect is negative but not significant. Results are not reported here
to conserve space.
19This is based on mother’s recall.
20To limit this concern, I interacted birth size with my war variable and could not find a
significant effect.
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already small at birth, remain shorter for their age. Although children could
catch up in growth during their first years of life if the environment is optimal
in terms of nutrition and health care, here they remain shorter.
Mother’s health during pregnancy can affect children’s development in utero.
Akresh and Verwimp (2011) use current BMI as a measurement for mother’s
health during pregnancy. It is possible to assume that in developing countries
the BMI does not change significantly over time, so that the current BMI was
the BMI before pregnancy started. But, I suggest a more robust measurement
for mother’s health during pregnancy: iron-deficiency anemia. I define women
having anemia with hemoglobin levels of less than 10 grams per deciliter blood
as a lower bound at the time of the interview. Anemia is chronic and starts early
in life in developing countries (WHO 2012b). Therefore, I can safely assume that
these women were also anemic during pregnancy. Anemic women have indeed
shorter children because of higher energy requirements during pregnancy, which
affects the in utero development of the child.
Utilization of health services during and after pregnancy can include vacci-
nations and checkups. Vaccinations and checkups during pregnancy and after-
wards have no significant effect on HAZ scores, although a majority of mothers
had access to these (and more) services. This finding contradicts the goal of
health programs promoting checkups and vaccinations in developing countries.
Finally, there is one unexpected finding. Breastfeeding has a negative ef-
fect on children’s height.21 It is surprising because the standard assumption is
that breastfeeding improves children’s health (WHO 2012). In some cases, how-
ever, mothers relying exclusively on breastfeeding lack complementary nutrition,
which can affect the development of the child (Fawzi et al. 1997). Streefkerk
and Moulik (1991) note that health services are underutilized (e.g. micronutri-
21Breastfeeding is defined as currently breastfeeding or not. I find similar results for the
NFHS-1 sample in using breastfeeding, but including breastfeeding reduces the sample size
drastically. Results can be requested.
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ents) in areas with less education in India. This can be particularly true in J&K
where the average level of education is less compared to other states of India
(Census of India 2001, 2011).
1.6 Robustness checks
I suggest two different sets of robustness checks. First, I focus on the effect
of the insurgency on height scores of children and test if they remain qualita-
tively similar under different specifications and assumptions. Second, I explore
briefly whether the experience of violence affects children in having symptoms
of diarrhea, another important health outcome for developing countries.22
1.6.1 Robustness checks for effects on height
There are a number of potential concerns that might confound the interpretation
of the results presented so far. I consider each in turn and offer some evidence
to allay these concerns. I only report the coefficients for the average treatment
effects of the insurgency on height (war) to conserve space.
The first issue of concern is migration. Mothers (and their young children)
migrating to safer districts because of violence experienced at the origin site
could bias the results upward. The process of migration is stressful and can
affect children’s height in addition to stresses caused by the exposure to vio-
lence. This concern is somewhat mitigated because most of the households in
my sample have been living at their current residence for more than 10 years.
Households in Jammu and Kashmir are poor on average, and moves tend to be
limited to cases of marriage. Even then, most marriages remain local. To check
for any lingering influences of migration, I exclude women living at their resi-
22I also test, but do not report, if they are more likely to be anemic or have a cough, but
results are more conclusive for diarrhea as the health outcome. Results can be requested from
the author.
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dence for less than three (and five) years. The results for the NFHS-2 and 3 are
robust and summarized in Table 1.7. The effects using the NFHS-1 change. At
the beginning of the insurgency, households migrated from the valley because
of the violence to the less-affected Jammu region resulting in different sample
sizes for the NFHS-1, thus explaining this change (Table 1.7).
[Table 1.7 about here]
Birth cohorts may be differently affected by the insurgency. I expect cohorts
born closer to peaks in violence to be shorter. I split the samples into 12 month
intervals for children up to the age of 36 months and into an older cohort (37
to 59 months) to assess this issue. The treatment effects vary by age cohorts
as expected (Table 1.7). For the NFHS-1, I find that children (age cohort 24
to 35 months) who were in utero during 1990, or born in 1990, are affected the
most. These children are up to four standard deviations shorter. Similarly, I
find for the NFHS-2 that children in utero or born around the 1996 peak in
violence are affected the most for the urban Kashmir region. For the NFHS-3,
I compare only the Kashmir with the Jammu region.23 As above, I cannot find
any significant effects of the insurgency for children living in the Kashmir region
itself.
[Table 1.7 about here]
1.6.2 Other health outcome - Symptoms of Diarrhea
A known result in the health literature is that children shorter for their age, be-
cause of negative external shocks, have (slightly) worse health outcomes through-
23I do not present results for urban Kashmir because this would result in very small samples
reducing the validity of any conclusions drawn from these results.
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out their life and perform more poorly in school and in the labor market. Here,
I test if the same children, who were earlier found to be shorter for their age be-
cause of the insurgency, are also more likely to be sick in the two weeks prior to
the survey. The health outcome I focus on is diarrhea. Diarrhea can be caused
by living conditions which can include access to clean water, food, or hygiene
in general (Bhandari, Bhan and Sazawal 1992, Jalan and Ravallion 2003, Sitara
et al. 2009, Kumar and Vollmer 2012, WHO 2012c).
I estimate a reduced form model for equation (1.1) with factors typically
considered as determinants of diarrhea, focusing on living conditions and health
service utilization early in life. To control for hygiene, I use information on the
availability of any type of toilet facilities in the household, or if they are shared
with others. Shared toilets are a source of bacteria (Kumar and Vollmer 2012).
Furthermore, food can be contaminated through many channels (e.g. the water,
the storage of food, or the food itself). I use access to water through a pipe
leading to a house or not, and if the child gets unboiled water or not. Public
water fountains can be contaminated with bacteria causing diarrhea (Jalan and
Ravallion 2003, Sitara et al. 2009). Similarly, unboiled water is a source of
contamination.
I also control for having a refrigerator in the household and for types of
food given to children regularly. Certain types of food can spoil more easily
(e.g. milk), especially if not stored properly. In addition, malnutrition can be
another source of diarrhea because children lack in vitamins to build up an
immune system (Lima and Guerrant 1992, Bhandari, Bhan, and Sazawal 1992).
Most of these control variables are only available for the NFHS-2 and NFHS-3.
I find that children living in more conflict-affected areas are more likely to
have diarrhea in the two weeks prior to the survey (Table 1.8). Children in the
Jammu district (NFHS-1) and in rural Kashmir (NFHS-2) are indeed sicker on
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the average. For the NFHS-3, I cannot find significant differences. Surprisingly,
controls for hygiene and contamination of food are insignificant in most spec-
ifications, which could be explained by the insurgency. The insurgency causes
children more affected by the experience of violence to be shorter. Through
this channel, they are also likely to be sicker. This experience can outweigh the
effects of typical factors causing diarrhea.
[Table 1.8 about here]
1.7 Conclusion
Health of children, defined as height for age z-scores (HAZ), is negatively af-
fected by the insurgency in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (India). The
Kashmir insurgency had three phases which allowed me to identify a series of
treatment and control groups of children across space and time. Children who
experienced violence in utero and early in their life, are 0.9 to 1.4 standard de-
viations shorter than children who experienced less or no violence early in their
life. The magnitude is similar to results found in the literature for stronger
forms of armed conflicts, such as wars.
The Kashmir insurgency differs from these stronger forms of conflict because
fewer civilians were killed, less infrastructure was destroyed, and mass disloca-
tion, which is typical for stronger forms of armed conflict, only took place in
the beginning of the insurgency for Hindus. Most of the exposure of violence
can be best described as a constant fear of militant acts and of harassment by
security force personnel stationed across Kashmir. Nevertheless, this constant
stress caused a similar impact on height of children as more violent forms of
conflict.
The results of the paper suggest that it is possible to identify groups more
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affected in their human capital development than others during armed conflicts.
Development programs, including those administered through non-governmental
organizations could be specifically designed to target these groups and help
ameliorate the negative effect of an armed conflict on future human capital
accumulation.
Finally, this paper is another in a line of recent work suggesting that armed
conflicts interrupt development processes. A government that allocates re-
sources to fight militancy and to restore order cannot also fund development
projects (health and literacy programs) for the least developed states in their
nation. The long-term consequences for the entire region are difficult to quan-
tify. In the context of the Kashmir insurgency, future research could estimate
these effects using the three survey rounds of the National Family Health Survey
(NFHS) and compare health outcomes across rounds.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Jammu and Kashmir district map
The districts most affected by violence are: Srinagar (40%), Baramula (17%), Kupwara (11%), Anantnag (10%),
Pulwama (7%) and Badgam (3%). The ranking is based on own calculations in using the event data set I created.
For the period 1990 to 2011 I have 1368 different events in total. 662 occurred in the period 1990 to 1996 only.
Figures 35
Figure 1.2: Number of victims for J&K - 1988 to 2007 - own calculations
Figure 1.3: Number of victims for J&K - 1988 to 2011 - Source of raw data:
SATP (2012)
Figures 36
Figure 1.4: Number of murder victims for Srinagar, Jammu and Doda district
1990 to 2006 - Source of raw data: INSCR (2012)
Figures 37
Figure 1.5: Local HAZ polynomials - own calculations
Figures 38
Figure 1.6: Phases of the insurgency and treatment / control groups
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Tables
Table 1.1: Number of insurgency related incidences - 1988 to 2010 - own calcu-
lations
Year Jammu region District average Jammu district Kashmir region District average Srinagar district
1988 0 0 0 3 0.5 3
1989 0 0 0 16 2.66 12
1990 0 0 0 91 15.16 60
1991 2 0.3 1 49 8.16 29
1992 9 1.5 3 94 15.66 45
1993 24 4 5 103 17.16 45
1994 21 3.5 0 65 10.8 17
1995 15 2.5 8 88 14.66 30
1996 5 0.83 0 77 12.83 22
1997 11 1.83 0 48 8 19
1998 37 6.16 1 41 6.83 16
1999 28 4.66 0 27 4.5 4
2000 27 4.5 0 59 9.83 10
2001 63 10.5 3 39 6.5 9
2002 67 11.16 16 31 5.16 4
2003 49 8.16 2 44 7.33 9
2004 7 1.16 4 16 2.66 2
2005 5 0.83 0 27 4.5 20
2006 18 3 0 21 3.5 10
2007 5 0.83 0 13 2.16 4
2008 4 0.66 2 8 1.33 0
2009 2 0.33 0 3 0.5 1
2010 0 0 0 6 1 3
Notes: Bold numbers indicate that absolute number of incidents is close or more than 50% of all incidents in this
particular year. I am using this event-data set in conjunction with findings in the literature. The reason is that it
is not possible to collect all insurgency related events without access to local archives. Especially the amount of
incidences in the Jammu district underestimates the effect of the insurgency. Given the amount of riots, murder
rates and looting early in the 90’s in the Jammu district (INSCR 2012), it is surprising that not more insurgency
related incidences are reported. One reason could be that only incidences in Kashmir made it into the literature,
because the Azaadi movement is mainly a Kashmiri one. Nonetheless, Jammu city is the winter capital of the state
which many government agencies present which can be targets for militants.
Tables 40
T
ab
le
1.
2:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
N
H
S
-1
,
2
a
n
d
3
fo
r
a
ll
J
a
m
m
u
a
n
d
K
a
sh
m
ir
N
F
H
S
-
1
N
F
S
H
-
2
N
F
S
H
-
3
(
0
t
o
5
9
m
o
n
t
h
s
)
(
0
t
o
3
6
m
o
n
t
h
s
)
(
0
t
o
5
9
m
o
n
t
h
s
)
u
r
b
a
n
(
n
=
2
3
3
)
r
u
r
a
l
(
n
=
4
6
3
)
u
r
b
a
n
(
n
=
2
1
3
)
r
u
r
a
l
(
n
=
7
4
9
)
u
r
b
a
n
(
n
=
2
7
7
)
r
u
r
a
l
(
n
=
9
4
9
)
C
h
il
d
r
e
n
’s
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
is
t
ic
s
H
A
Z
-1
.5
3
6
-1
.4
1
8
-1
.3
3
8
-1
.7
0
7
-1
.1
4
4
-1
.3
6
2
A
g
e
in
m
o
n
t
h
s
2
5
.8
9
2
6
.0
3
1
8
.4
2
1
6
.7
2
3
0
.1
8
2
9
.5
6
B
o
y
s
5
7
.9
4
%
5
3
.3
5
%
5
4
.0
1
%
5
5
.1
8
%
5
2
.7
1
%
5
2
.3
7
%
S
m
a
ll
a
t
b
ir
t
h
2
5
.0
0
%
2
3
.5
4
%
2
8
.2
7
%
3
1
.1
1
%
2
5
.3
6
%
3
3
.0
5
%
Ir
o
n
S
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
t
9
1
.8
5
%
7
8
.6
2
%
8
3
.0
5
%
6
9
.3
6
%
7
9
.1
7
%
6
4
.6
3
%
V
it
a
m
in
A
3
4
.3
6
%
2
1
.7
4
%
4
1
.2
1
%
2
5
.2
7
%
n
.a
.
n
.a
.
C
o
m
p
li
c
a
t
io
n
s
a
t
b
ir
t
h
3
2
.1
9
%
2
2
.8
9
%
3
4
.2
1
%
1
6
.5
5
%
3
1
.0
5
%
9
.1
7
%
A
n
t
e
n
a
t
a
l
C
h
e
c
k
u
p
9
8
.2
8
%
8
6
.1
8
%
9
7
.0
5
%
8
1
.8
8
%
9
4
.4
4
%
8
2
.6
7
%
T
e
t
a
n
u
s
V
a
c
c
in
a
t
io
n
9
8
.2
8
%
8
5
.1
0
%
9
4
.4
9
%
8
6
.1
1
%
9
5
.3
3
%
8
4
.1
0
%
D
ia
r
r
h
e
a
la
s
t
t
w
o
w
e
e
k
s
2
3
.3
8
%
1
9
.3
5
%
3
1
.5
1
%
3
2
.6
2
%
4
.5
5
%
1
1
.5
0
%
M
o
t
h
e
r
’s
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
is
t
ic
s
A
g
e
in
y
e
a
r
s
2
5
.4
8
2
3
.7
6
2
6
.9
5
2
6
.8
4
2
8
.9
8
2
7
.8
1
Y
e
a
r
s
o
f
S
c
h
o
o
li
n
g
8
.5
9
3
.7
7
6
.2
2
2
.5
6
7
.4
1
3
.3
9
H
in
d
u
8
5
.4
1
%
7
6
.2
4
%
3
0
.8
0
%
4
0
.4
1
%
4
0
.7
9
%
2
9
.0
8
%
M
u
s
li
m
4
.2
9
%
1
5
.3
3
%
5
8
.2
3
%
5
8
.8
8
%
5
4
.1
5
%
7
0
.8
1
%
H
e
ig
h
t
(
c
m
)
n
.a
.
n
.a
.
1
5
3
.2
0
1
5
3
.5
9
1
5
3
.7
2
1
5
4
.3
5
C
h
il
d
r
e
n
e
v
e
r
b
o
r
n
2
.3
3
3
.0
9
2
.5
2
3
.1
3
2
.4
4
3
.0
8
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
’s
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
is
t
ic
s
O
w
n
s
L
a
n
d
1
8
.4
5
%
7
4
.2
4
%
2
.5
3
%
1
8
.0
0
%
3
0
.6
9
%
7
7
.2
4
%
O
w
n
s
L
iv
e
s
t
o
c
k
1
8
.4
5
%
7
8
.1
4
%
n
.a
.
n
.a
.
2
4
.1
9
%
7
7
.0
3
%
S
c
h
e
d
u
le
d
T
r
ib
e
0
1
.7
4
%
1
9
.4
1
3
0
.8
7
%
2
1
.3
0
%
3
8
.2
5
%
N
o
t
e
s
:
F
o
r
t
h
e
N
F
H
S
-1
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
c
h
o
o
li
n
g
,
I
a
s
s
u
m
e
m
is
s
in
g
v
a
lu
e
s
in
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
c
h
o
o
li
n
g
t
o
b
e
z
e
r
o
.
G
iv
e
n
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
le
b
a
r
e
ly
in
c
lu
d
e
s
a
n
y
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
o
f
a
s
c
h
e
d
u
le
d
t
r
ib
e
,
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
c
h
o
o
li
n
g
li
k
e
ly
o
v
e
r
s
t
a
t
e
s
t
h
e
t
r
u
e
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
c
h
o
o
li
n
g
.
Tables 41
Table 1.3: DID regressions based on NFHS-1 children 0 to 36 months
Treatment group Jammu district cohort rural Jammu district cohort
Control Group rest of Jammu model rest of Jammu model
War -1.032** -1.440** -.528** -1.342**
( .317) (.591) (.140) (.632)
Age child -.212*** -.243** -.254** -.194***
( .043) ( .052) (.065) ( .074)
Male -.240 .002 -.264 -.000
( .144) (.273) (.211) (.292)
Age mother .097*** .131** .085* .065
( .013) ( .055) (.033) ( .061)
Education .015 .032 .021 .038
( .021) ( .037) ( .026) (.035)
Muslim .384* .556 .263 -.734
( .168) ( .583) (.233) ( 1.019)
Number of Children born -.374 -.781 -.540 -1.443**
( .457) (.806) (.540) (.702)
Scheduled tribe -.328 -.334 -.578 .724
( .367) ( .836) ( .432) ( 1.219)
Abortion ever .055 .183 -.126 .349
(.151) (.387) (.405) (.441)
Small at Birth -.807*** -.138 -.697 -.103
(.172) (.342) (.356) (.304)
Complications at Birth .221 .483 .154 -.141
(.315) ( .365) (.364) (.308)
Antenatal Care 1.292 .259 1.070 .503
(.807) ( 1.672) ( .800) (1.059)
Tetanus vaccination -.933 .544 -.767 -.207
( .967) ( 1.589) (.944) (1.087)
Home delivery .086 .418 .215 .144
(.073) (.356) ( .174) (.321)
R2 0.61 0.80 0.63 0.76
N 337 159 225 159
Time trend yes yes yes yes
Birth F.E. yes yes yes yes
City F.E. yes yes no no
District F.E. yes no yes no
State F.E. yes yes yes yes
HH controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: Household controls include owning a TV (for urban areas), owning land and livestock (for rural areas), and
birth order. The cohort model includes children living in the same district but compares outcomes of children age
0 to 35 months with an older cohort. The older cohort was in utero or born before the outbreak of the insurgency.
Robust and clustered at the district level standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.4: DID regressions based on NFHS-2 children 0 to 36 months
Treatment group urban Kashmir other urban districts
Control group urban Jammu all urban districts
War -2.553*** -1.523***
(.371) ( .334)
Age child -.166 -.150
( .153) ( .167)
Male -.136 -.216
(.216) ( .206)
Age mother -.012 -.009
( .034) ( .029)
Education .055* .067*
( .028) ( .033)
Height mother .088** .089**
( .028) ( .029)
Anemia mother -.756** -.877***
(.225) ( .231)
Muslim 1.784*** 1.743**
( .466) (.563)
Number of children -.041 .087
born ( .489) ( .661)
Wanted child .163 .167
( .287) ( .317)
Abortion ever -.143 -.199
(.295) ( .313)
Small at birth -.488* -.410*
(.234) ( .182)
Tetanus vaccination -.087 -.070
(.300) ( .327)
Prenatal Care -.560 -.309
(.476) ( .581)
Doctor assistance -.366 -.445
at birth (.756) ( .787)
Antenatal Care -.097* -.097*
(.043) ( .043)
Home delivery -.495 -.404
(.658) ( .726)
Currently -.823** -.721**
Breastfeeding ( .305) (.284)
R2 0.42 0.44
N 178 178
Time trend yes yes
Birth F.E. yes yes
City F.E. yes yes
District F.E. yes yes
State F.E. yes yes
HH controls: yes yes
Notes: Household controls include owning a TV, refridgerator and land. Furthermore, controls include if a
household belongs to a scheduled class or not. I do not present cohort models because the NFHS-2 only includes
children age 0 to 36 months. The model for ”other urban districts” focuses on districts in Kashmir affected by
violence the most. These districts (Anantnag, Badgam and Kupwara) are compared to districts less and not
affected by violence. Robust and clustered at the district level standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.5: DID regressions based on NFHS-3 children 0 to 36 months
Treatment group Kashmir urban Kashmir
Control group Jammu urban Jammu
War -.251 -1.590**
(.286) ( .738)
War*Hindu -.478* -.239
(.261) (.647)
Age child -.214** -.285
( .102) ( .286)
Male .056 -.030
( .174) ( .265)
Age mother .005 -.020
( .021) ( .045)
Education .019 -.046
( .022) ( .038)
Height mother .066*** .059**
(.015) ( .028)
Anemia mother -.321 .077
( .205) (.389)
Number of children -.015 -.061
born ( .085) ( .177)
Wanted child .035 -.357
( .221) (.420)
Abortion ever .032 .314
( .215) ( .426)
Small at birth -.404** -.972***
( .184) (.272)
Tetanus vaccination -.387
( .372)
Prenatal Care .053 .906
(.280) ( .556)
Doctor assistance -.243 -.298
at birth (.398) ( .596)
Antenatal Care .095 -.858
(.419) ( .946)
Home delivery -.029 -.730
( .424) (.610)
Currently -.026 -.210
Breastfeeding (.205) ( .324)
R2 0.22 0.63
N 475 102
Time trend yes yes
Birth F.E. yes yes
City F.E. yes yes
District F.E. no no
State F.E. yes yes
HH controls yes yes
.
Notes: Household controls include owning a tv, refridgerator, owning land, belonging to a scheduled cast, birth
order and the altitude a household lives in. Robust and clustered at the district level standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1.6: Migration - Years living at current residence - NFHS-1, 2 and 3
NFHS-1 NFHS-2 NFHS-3
Jammu Jammu Kashmir Other J&K J&K
rural urban urban
Years>3
War -1.562* -.791 -3.919*** -.268** -.366 -1.897*
( .650) ( .194) (.729) ( .081) ( .306) (.982)
R2 0.69 0.71 0.46 0.26 0.19 0.52
N 229 163 134 387 471 101
Years>5
War 1.248 -1.758 -1.431 -.269** -.254 -1.866
( .945) ( .313) ( .777) ( .081) ( .333) ( 1.215)
R2 0.75 0.80 0.53 0.25 0.19 0.53
N 129 93 115 353 415 93
Notes: Models with high levels of multicollinearity, because of a too small sample sizes, are not reported here.
Robust and clustered at the district level standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.7: Exposure to violence by birth cohorts - NFHS-1, 2 and 3
NFHS-1 NFHS-2 NFHS-3
Jammu Jammu Kashmir others Kashmir
rural urban districts
36 to 59 months
War 1.077 .233 n.a. n.a. .405
(.760) ( .454) (.413)
R2 0.71 0.76 0.27
N 128 76 198
24 to 35 months
War -4.376* -4.167*** -3.436*** -.754** .309
( 1.918) (.711) ( .239) (.204) (.630)
R2 0.76 0.80 0.59 0.46 0.24
N 99 62 65 124 138
12 to 23 months
War -.728 -1.097 2.683** .021 -.503
( .395) ( .962) (.845) (.215) ( .409)
R2 0.73 0.80 0.75 0.42 0.30
N 123 87 59 128 207
<12 months
War .729 1.714 n.a. -.569** -.746
( 1.442) ( 0.78) ( .180) ( .548)
R2 0.66 0.78 0.32 0.28
N 115 147 157 172
Notes: Models with high levels of multicollinearity, because of a too small sample sizes, are not reported here.
Robust and clustered at the district level standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.8: Other dimension of health - symptoms of diarrhea two weeks prior
to the survey
NFHS-1 NFHS-2 NFHS-3
Treatment group Jammu district urban Kashmir rural Kashmir all Kashmir
Control group other districts urban Jammu rural Jammu all Jammu
War .449*** -.029 .556** .083
( .146) ( .178) ( .193) ( .057)
Age child .006 -.085 -.053 -.080***
( .011) ( .048) ( .049) ( .019)
Male -.012 .034 .016 -.004
( .062) (.066) ( .048) ( .030)
Age mother -.026* -.019 -.006 -.005
( .010) ( .012) ( .006) ( .004)
Education .010* .010 .000 .007*
( .004) ( .008) ( .003) (.004)
Muslim .055 -.196* -.297*** -.040
( .138) ( .082) ( .050) (.046)
Currently -.006 .185** .092 -.023
Breastfeeding (.004) ( .065) ( .056) (.040)
No toilet in house .179 .026 -.056 .052
( .004) ( .131) ( .059) ( .047)
Birth order -.053 .045 .003 .004
( .137) ( .030) ( .017) ( .013)
Small at birth .191** -.061 -.001 .040
( .048) ( .071) ( .045) ( .036)
Water pipe n.a. .154 -.026 -.041
(.225) ( .043) ( .040)
Owns Refrigerator n.a. -.076 .140** .039
(.116) (.048) (.051)
Gave plain water n.a. .440*** .016 .013
(.075) ( .096) ( .051)
Gave Fresh Milk n.a. .011 .080 -.009
( .095) (.044) ( .035)
Gave Fruits n.a. .100* -.061 .007
( .040) (.047) ( .039)
R2 0.31 0.22 0.09 0.10
N 154 165 589 510
Time trend yes yes yes yes
Birth F.E. yes yes yes yes
City F.E. yes yes yes yes
District F.E. yes yes yes no
State F.E. yes yes yes yes
HH controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: Models with high levels of multicollinearity, because of a too small sample sizes, are not reported here.
Household controls include owning land and livestock, owning a TV, and belonging to a schedule tribe. Robust
and clustered at the district level standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Chapter 2
Education and Armed
Conflict: The Kashmir
Insurgency in the Nineties
2.1 Introduction
Armed conflicts change the supply of education (e.g. through occupied school
buildings or migration of teachers) and the demand for education (lower returns
to education). Thus, an armed conflict can reduce the education (e.g. years of
schooling) of individuals.
Armed conflicts vary by the intensity of violence, and range from wars (or
civil wars) to a possibly weaker form of an armed conflict insurgencies. Wars
and civil wars can be intense. They destroy infrastructures and lives during
the entire conflict period and have strong and long-lasting negative impacts
on education (Akresh and de Walque 2008, Akbulut-Yuksel 2009, Swee 2009,
Shemyakina 2011, and Chamarbagwala and Moran 2011). Insurgencies have
phases with peaks in violence but also phases with low levels of violence. Thus,
the experience of violence can be different during an insurgency.
In using the Kashmir experience, I add another variation of an armed conflict
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to the discussion. The Kashmir insurgency is an ongoing conflict which started
in 1990. I use the 2005/06 National Family Health Survey for India (NFHS-3) to
estimate the impact of the insurgency on girls who were of school age during the
first phase of the insurgency from 1990 to 1996. I compare educational outcomes
of girls more affected by the experience of violence with girls less affected.
The underlying trend in the educational system of Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) is a positive one during the 1990s. Individuals have more years of school-
ing, enroll more into primary and secondary education, and drop out of schools
less. This is true for the state overall, but once focusing on groups more affected
by violence, I find that girls living in the major cities of Kashmir do not benefit
from the underlying positive development. Overall, the average treatment ef-
fect of the insurgency on years of schooling shows a negative but not significant
impact on schooling. The results remain qualitatively robust, once accounting
for migration, different age cohorts, and a different identification of Kashmiri.
Previous research found strong and negative impacts of armed conflicts on
years of schooling. Here, I find an insignificant impact on years of schooling be-
cause the Kashmir insurgency is less intense when compared with other armed
conflicts. The goal of the Indian government was to suppress any form of rebel-
lion, which resulted in sending in tens of thousands armed forces into the major
cities of the valley of Kashmir. Another goal was, to keep daily routines running
as ”normal” as possible for civilians (Joshi 1999). Anecdotal evidence suggests
that schools were occupied by armed forces and militants during the insurgency
(Asia Watch 1993, Schofield 2001), but new schools and more teachers were
hired in J&K (J&K Directorate of Statistics 2011). This development weakened
the impact of an armed conflict on years of schooling.
I also test the impact of the insurgency on school completion and school
enrollment as other channels to education. I find that dropout rates for primary
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education increased. Surprisingly, enrollment into primary education increased
in Kashmir.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces to the relevant
literature, while section 3 describes the Kashmir insurgency. In Section 4, I
introduce to the data and explain my identification strategy. Results for years
of schooling are discussed in section 5, followed by robustness checks in section
6. In section 7, I explore the effect of the insurgency on school completion and
school enrollment. The paper concludes in section 8.
2.2 Literature Review
Armed conflicts can change the supply and demand for education (Shemyakina
2011, Chamarbagwala and Moran 2011). The supply of education is reduced
because school buildings get destroyed or occupied by armed forces and mili-
tants. Another reason is that teachers migrate to safer regions. The demand
for education can decrease because of the increased risk of going to school. This
is especially true for girls because parents want to protect them from the risk
of being exposed to violence (Shemyakina 2011). Furthermore, the schooling
decision is affected by decreased returns to education during and after a conflict
because of changing labor market opportunities.
Schooling outcomes are less for children in Germany who lived in high-
intensity bombing areas during WW II (Akbulut-Yuksel 2009). These children
have up to 1.2 fewer years of schooling and earn up to 6% less as adults, com-
pared with children less affected by Allied bombings. Boys in Rwanda, who
experienced and survived the 1994 genocide, have up to 1.5 years less schooling
(Akresh and de Walque 2008). Given that average schooling in Rwanda is four
years only, the genocide had a large impact on education. Swee (2009) finds
for the civil war in Bosnia that children are up to 3% less likely to complete
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secondary schooling. Shemyakina (2011) finds for the civil war in Tajikistan,
that girls and boys of school-age are less likely to complete their mandatory
schooling compared with children less affected by the civil war. Furthermore,
the demand for education decreased in more conflict-affected regions. Finally,
Chamarbagwala and Moran (2011) explore the long-term consequences of the
36-year long civil war in Guatemala. This civil war has short phases of high
levels of violence and long phases of low levels of violence which is similar to
the Kashmir insurgency. They find that rural households lose up to one year of
education on average when compared with urban households.
Literature on the negative impacts of the Kashmir insurgency on human
capital outcomes is limited. Educational outcomes, especially for Kashmir, are
assumed to be negative (Asia Watch 1993, Joshi 1999, Schofield 2001, Kash-
mircorps 2008), but no quantitative support for the statement exists so far.
Reports, based on various rounds of the NFHS, draw a positive picture for
years of schooling for the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir (UNESCO 2010),
but ignore the effects on individuals more affected by the conflict.
2.3 The Kashmir insurgency
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is one of the 28 states in India. It consists of three
parts: Jammu, Kashmir, also known as the valley of Kashmir, and Ladakh.
Those three parts are different from each other by composition of the popu-
lation, historical background and the language. Ladakh is barely populated.
The overall population of 12.5 Million is split between Jammu (43%) and Kash-
mir (55%). Kashmir has a Muslim majority of 97%, which speaks Kashmiri.
Kashmiri is almost exclusively spoken in the valley.
The state of J&K has been the reason for three short wars between India
and Pakistan over the territory (1947, 1965 and 1999). India and Pakistan claim
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the region for themselves. This is known as the Kashmir conflict or sometimes
as a ”proxy war” between India and Pakistan with skirmishes around the Line
of Control (LoC). The LoC is separating the Indian and Pakistani part of the
Kashmir region.
Today, the insurgency itself is embedded in the dispute between these two
powers, but started as a movement for independence of Kashmiri Muslims called:
”Azaadi” (freedom). J&K experienced economic improvements during the late
Seventies and Eighties but many in the valley felt left out (Habibullah 2008).
The local government remained corrupt, most public jobs went to Hindus, and
the Kashmiri did not feel represented in the state assembly and parliament
(Habibullah 2008).
The official start of the insurgency is after the December 1989 kidnapping of
Rubaiya Sayeed, the daughter of the Indian minister for Kashmir affairs. After
her release, the Indian central government sent security forces into J&K to break
down any form of rebellion.
The insurgency can be split up into three phases (Meyerle 2008, SATP 2011).
The first phase was from 1990 to 1996, where militancy focused on urban areas
of Kashmir. From the late 1990s to 2001/02, militancy moved to more rural
areas of Kashmir and districts of Jammu. The third phase is from 2002 to today.
This phase is a low intensity insurgency. My focus is on the first phase of the
insurgency.
During the first phase of the insurgency most violent events took place in
urban areas of Kashmir, especially the capital Srinagar city. Up to 100,000
Hindus left the valley in the first two years and left behind a Muslim majority
(Asia Watch 1993). By the mid 1990s, Indian security forces controlled major
cities, where militancy died out slowly. ”Normalcy” (Joshi 1999, p.92) returned
to the urban areas of Kashmir and elections could be held again in 1996.
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Figure 2.1 shows the districts of Jammu and Kashmir. The districts mostly
affected by the insurgency during the early 1990s were: Srinagar, especially
Srinagar city, Baramula, Kupwara, Anantnag, Pulwama and Badgam. I ranked
the districts according to own calculations based on a novel event-dataset I
created using existing literature on the insurgency (Table 2.1).
Figure 2.2 shows overall numbers of victims of the insurgency from 1990 to
2011. As a lower bound, the insurgency cost the lives of 14,634 civilians, 6,007
security forces and 22,535 militants, as well the destruction of local infrastruc-
ture in the last two decades (SATP 2011). The first phase started 1990 with a
large increase in victims and peaked in 1996. After 1996, the number of civilian
victims is below the pre-1996 levels. The insurgency changed and cost more
lives of militants and security forces.
[Figure 2.1: about here]
[Figure 2.2: about here]
[Table 2.1: about here]
2.4 Data and empirical strategy
2.4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
I utilize the 2005/06 National Family Health Survey for India (NFHS-3). It is a
representative survey conducted at the state level focusing on health of women
and children, but also offering demographic background questions. For the state
of Jammu and Kashmir, I have information on 3,281 ever-married women (ages
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15 - 49). The sample is representative in respect to composition of religion and
language spoken. Household size is close to the national average (Census of
India 2001, 2011).
Here, I discuss differentials and long-run trends in average years of schooling
between regions in J&K, which aids identifying groups for the difference in
difference analysis following. Table 2.2 summarizes descriptive statistics for
urban and rural areas of J&K, as well as for the Jammu and the Kashmir region
itself. There are differences in years of schooling between urban and rural areas.
Women in rural areas of J&K, especially in the Kashmir region, work in activities
(e.g. horticulture) requiring less education (Joshi 1999). A similar differential
exists between the Jammu and the Kashmir region. A possible explanation is
that most of the tourism and the horticulture in the state takes place in the
Kashmir region itself (Joshi 1999, J&K Directorate of Statistics 2011, Sharma,
Sharma and Wari 2012). Women working in these sectors typically do not
require more than primary education.
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate long-run trends in years of schooling between
urban and rural areas of J&K and between the Jammu and the Kashmir re-
gion itself. One of the long-term development goals of the Indian government
is to increase literacy rates of the population (Fifth All India Education Survey
1985). Thus, the trends show that younger cohorts of women have more edu-
cation than older cohorts of women besides women who started their primary
education during the insurgency (ages 15 - 21).
[Figure 2.3 and 2.4 about here]
[Table 2.2 about here]
2.4 Data and empirical strategy 53
2.4.2 Identification and empirical strategy
To employ a difference in difference analysis (DID), I need to identify girls more
affected by the insurgency than others to be able to compare their educational
outcomes. The actual treatment is the insurgency. The treatment group consists
of girls who were of school age during the first phase of the insurgency (1990 to
1996) and who lived in Kashmir. There are two possible control groups. First,
girls who finished their schooling before the insurgency broke out, and second
girls of school age during the first phase of the insurgency but living in less
affected regions of J&K.
In India compulsory primary schooling covers ages 6 - 14. From age 15
onwards, children can enroll in secondary schools. By the age of 15, children
should have completed primary education. The treatment group is the age
cohort 15 - 29 in 2005. Everyone older than 29 should have completed primary
education by 1990. Furthermore, most of the violence took place in the urban
areas of Kashmir during the first phase of the insurgency, especially in major
cities.
One drawback of the NFHS-3 is that I cannot identify the exact location
(district or valley) of the household. I use language spoken as the identifier.
Jammu and Kashmir has distinct languages spoken in some parts but not oth-
ers. Kashmiri is almost exclusively spoken in the valley. In my sample 55%
speak Kashmiri while 45% speak the remaining languages. This reflects the
composition of the J&K population with around 55% in Kashmir and 45% in
Jammu.
My empirical model is the following:
Yijt = α+ γ(war) + βXi + δj + ωt + τ + ijt (2.1)
where Yijt is years of schooling for individual i, living in j, and belonging to age
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cohort t. The parameter γ is the average treatment effect of the insurgency on
girls more affected by the insurgency compared with girls less affected by the
insurgency. The parameter Xi is a vector, including demographic controls. The
parameter δj reflects regional fixed effects. The parameter ωt controls for cohort
fixed effects and the parameter τ controls for time fixed effects. The parameter
ijt is the usual error-term.
2.5 Results
I use difference in difference regressions. Results are presented in Table 2.3.
I compare years of schooling of a younger cohort (age 15 - 29) to outcomes
of an older cohort (age > 29) and to girls of the same age but living in less
affected areas. The younger cohort went to school during the first phase of the
insurgency, while the older cohort finished schooling before the outbreak of the
insurgency in 1990.
Most of the violence during the 1990s took place in the urban areas of Kash-
mir, especially in larger cities, like Srinagar city. I have no information on the
district a household lives in. Thus, I split the treatment group into girls liv-
ing in urban areas and girls living in cities. The difference between these two
treatment groups is that I exclude towns from the former.1 The older control
groups live in the same region or in rural areas. I expect girls in urban (and
cities) areas to have better school outcomes compared with older cohorts living
in urban and rural areas.
The average treatment effect (war) for girls living in urban areas is negative
but not significant. I find a similar effect of the insurgency for girls living in
cities (column 2). One explanation for the insignificant effect of the insurgency
on years of schooling is the amount of security forces deployed throughout cities
1Towns have a population of less than 10,000, which has rural characteristics.
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in the valley which made going to school relatively safe. Another explanation is
that the supply of schooling itself did not deteriorate as much as in other armed
conflicts (Swee 2009, Shemyakina 2011). Dabla (2010) notes that especially in
Srinagar city private schools opened to counteract the negative effects of public
schools occupied by the military and the militants. These two developments
can weaken the negative effect of an armed conflict on years of schooling.
Confounding variables like age have the expected negative effect on years
of schooling, because older individuals should have less education compared to
younger individuals. Furthermore, Muslims have less education compared to
Hindus. Muslim women work mainly in handicraft or at home, which requires
less education in general (J&K Directorate of Statistics 2011).
[Table 2.3 about here]
The trend in J&K is towards more education. Girls more affected by the
insurgency are left out from the overall positive development in the educational
sector. Overall, the insurgency did not affect years of schooling negatively.
The reason is that ”normalcy” came back to the valley after 1992 (Joshi 1999).
Despite the outbreak of the insurgency, the goal of the local government was to
keep daily routines running as normal as possible.
2.6 Robustness checks
The above results could be influenced by potential migration of households
because of the insurgency, the chosen age cohort for girls more affected by the
insurgency, and my identification of the Kashmir region.
First, considering migration, households migrate to safer regions if the ex-
perience of violence becomes too intense. While up to 100,000 Hindus left the
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valley in the beginning of the insurgency, migration of Kashmiri is not reported
in various NGO reports. Furthermore, given that women marry early in India,
girls who were of school age during the 1990s do not necessarily have to live in
the same locality in 2005 when the survey was undertaken. Overall, households
live for more than ten years on the average at their current residence.2 I restrict
my samples to women who have lived more than ten (or 15) years at their cur-
rent residence. I find similar effects of the insurgency on years of schooling as
before (Table 2.4).
Another concern is that different age groups are differently affected by the
experience of violence. Girls who went to school in the beginning of the in-
surgency experienced more violence than girls who went to school at the end
of the first phase of the insurgency. Here, I split the treatment groups into
three age groups. Ages 27 - 29 finished primary schooling at the beginning of
the insurgency. Ages 22 - 26 experienced violence during the insurgency. The
youngest age group, ages 15 - 21, began their schooling at the end of the of the
first phase, where ”normalcy” returned to the cities of Kashmir (Joshi 1999).
I find similar effects as before, but smaller in magnitude for the oldest cohort
(Table 2.4). Given that these girls completed most of their schooling around
the outbreak of the insurgency, this finding is not unexpected.
Finally, one can argue that using only language spoken to identify the
Kashmir region could also include individuals speaking Kashmiri in districts
of Jammu which are close to the valley. Districts in Jammu with a Kashmiri
minority include Doda, Rajouri and Poonch. To overcome this issue, I use infor-
mation on primary sampling units (PSU) and language spoken. I assume that
every PSU with a majority of Kashmiri speaking women is within Kashmir. In
my sample, I get a small change in composition. I have some non-Kashmiri
speaking women in the sample for Kashmir, and around 40 Kashmiri speaking
2Years lived at the current residence refers to the locality a households lives in.
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women in the sample for Jammu. I do not expect the results to be affected
significantly. The effect of the insurgency on years of schooling remains qual-
itatively similar compared to only using language spoken to identify Kashmir
(Table 2.4).
[Table 2.4 about here]
2.7 Channels to differentiated educational
attainment
An armed conflict does not only affect years of schooling of individuals, but also
the decision to drop out of school and the decision to enroll in schools during a
conflict. My focus is on girls of primary school age (ages 15 - 29 in 2005) and
of secondary school age (ages 25 - 34 in 2005). Their outcomes are compared
with girls less affected by the insurgency.
2.7.1 School completion
Children enrolled in schools during an armed conflict are more likely to drop out
for safety reasons. Furthermore, the reduced supply of education can increase
dropout rates.
My dependent variable takes the value ’1’, if someone completed primary
(or secondary) schooling and zero otherwise. Controls for quality of education
(teacher-student ratios, school-student ratios) are added to my previous spec-
ifications. Data for the quality of education are from the J&K Directorate of
Statistics (2011), and available for the pre-insurgency period and for the school
year 1990/91. I assign different values for different age cohorts who went to
school before 1990. For the affected age cohort, I take the 1990/91 values for
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the entire first phase of the insurgency.3 I present the results for school com-
pletion in Table 2.5.
Girls enrolled in primary education and living in the cities of Kashmir are
less likely to complete primary schooling because of the insurgency. Compared
to years of schooling, the average treatment effect is significant. As expected,
more teachers and schools per students have a positive effect on completing
primary schooling, but only school ratios are significant. In the second part of
Table 5, I show results for girls completing secondary education. The insurgency
did not affect girls living in cities negatively. Given that fewer girls enroll in sec-
ondary education, these girls select themselves into secondary education. They
are more willing to finish secondary education, even in the situation of an armed
conflict.4 Surprisingly, higher teacher and school ratios have negative impacts
on completing secondary education. Smaller classes can reduce the ability of
working with other students, which could be a disadvantage in situations where
resources are less available in general.
[Table 2.5 about here]
2.7.2 School enrollment
School enrollment can be affected by an armed conflict in various ways. School
buildings get destroyed, or occupied, and teachers can migrate to safer regions.
Through the reduced supply of schooling the demand cannot be met. Further-
more, the demand for education can decrease, because parents decide to keep
their children at home for safety reasons.
School enrollment is a binary variable and takes the value ’1’ if somebody is
enrolled in primary (or secondary) education and zero otherwise. I use schools
3These ratios are higher compared to the pre 1990 values.
4I cannot control for this selection bias in my models because of the lack of data (e.g.
parents and household information when girls were of school age).
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per capita and teachers per capita to proxy for the supply of education. To
proxy for the demand for education, I use altitude. Jammu and Kashmir is a
very mountainous area. Households living in higher areas have less access to
schooling, especially to secondary education (Raza, Ahmad and Sheel 1990).
My results are presented in Table 2.6.
I find that school enrollment in primary education increased for girls liv-
ing in the cities of Kashmir. This can be interpreted in two ways. First, the
experience of violence did not deter girls from enrolling in primary education.
Second, the insurgency changed local labor markets. One of the main sources
of income before the insurgency broke out was tourism (Joshi 1999, J&K Direc-
torate of Statistics 2011). Tourism sharply declined after 1990 (J&K Directorate
of Statistics 2011) which could explain why girls enrolled more in primary educa-
tion. Most jobs in tourism require less education (e.g. service jobs). These girls
enrolled more in primary education to improve their labor market prospects.
However, the demand for secondary education did not increase. This can be
explained by the deteriorated safety situation. If fewer girls enroll into secondary
education in general, then these girls are likely the first who are deterred by an
armed conflict.
More teachers and schools per capita have the expected positive effect on
school enrollment, but only schools per capita have a significant effect. The role
of altitude is different for secondary schooling compared with primary school-
ing. Altitude has a positive effect on secondary school enrollment. As argued
above, these girls are different in selecting themselves into secondary schooling,
and take commuting to less mountainous areas into account in their decision to
enroll in secondary education.
[Table 2.6 about here]
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2.8 Conclusion
The experience of the Kashmir insurgency is different from other armed con-
flicts in the literature. Armed conflicts, like WW II or the Rwandian genocide,
reduced years of schooling of children more affected by the conflict compared
with children less affected. Here, the Kashmir insurgency did not reduce years
of schooling of girls more affected by the insurgency. This finding can be ex-
plained by the coping strategy of the Indian central government. India sent in
tens of thousands security forces to fight any form of militancy at the begin-
ning of the insurgency. By the mid 1990s, a few hundred thousand security
forces were deployed in Kashmir, which weakened any form of militancy, and
therefore civilians were possibly less exposed to violence. The goal of the local
(and central) government was to keep daily routines running as ”normal” as
possible, given the armed conflict (Joshi 1999). Furthermore, during the 1990s
more schools were opened, and more teachers were hired, not just in safe regions
of the state (Dabla 2010). Both developments can attribute to a weak effect
of the insurgency on years of schooling, which remained qualitatively similar
in a series of robustness checks. These checks include accounting for possible
migration by Kashmiri households to safer regions, different age cohorts and a
different identification of the Kashmir region.
While the insurgency has an insignificant negative effect on years of school-
ing, girls of primary school age and living in cities of Kashmir were more likely
to drop out from primary education when compared with girls less affected by
the insurgency. A surprising finding is that these girls are more likely to enroll
into primary education. Given that employment opportunities vanished during
the 1990s, girls enrolled in more education to increase their chances in the labor
market. The increase in school enrollment and the opposing force of increased
school dropout rates can additionally explain why the effect of the insurgency
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on years of schooling is limited.
The experience of the Kashmir insurgency in the 1990s shows that if the
local government can deal with an armed conflict, years of schooling does not
decrease. Though, it should be kept in mind that during the 1990s, a human
rights crisis took place in the valley of Kashmir. Security forces unfamiliar with
the territory, and overwhelmed in dealing with militancy, committed countless
examples of human right violations against the civilian population, including
kidnapping, torture and rape of girls and women (Asia Watch 1993, Schofield
2001) which has a negative and long-lasting impact on a different human capital
outcome: height of children (Parlow 2012).
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Jammu and Kashmir district map
The districts most affected by violence are: Srinargar (40%), Baramula (17%), Kupwara (11%), Anantnag (10%),
Pulwama (7%) and Badgam (3%). The ranking is based on own calculations in using the event data set I created.
For the period 1990 to 2011, I have 1368 different events in total. 662 occured in the period 1990 to 1996 only.
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Figure 2.2: Number of victims for J&K - 1988 to 2011 - Source of raw data:
SATP (2011)
Figure 2.3: Average years of schooling - Urban vs. rural Jammu & Kashmir
Notes: Years of schooling is presented by age. Younger cohorts (especially age 15 to 21) obtained
most of their primary education during the insurgency.
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Figure 2.4: Average years of schooling - Kashmir region vs. Jammu region
Notes: Years of schooling is presented by age. Younger cohorts (especially age 15 to 21) obtained
most of their primary education during the insurgency.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Number of insurgency related incidences - 1988 to 2007 - own calcu-
lations
Year Jammu Kashmir Srinagar only
1988 0 3 3
1989 0 16 12
1990 0 91 60
1991 2 49 29
1992 9 94 45
1993 24 103 45
1994 21 65 17
1995 15 88 30
1996 5 77 22
1997 11 48 19
1998 37 41 16
1999 28 27 4
2000 27 59 10
2001 63 39 9
2002 67 31 4
2003 49 44 9
2004 7 16 2
2005 5 27 20
2006 18 21 10
2007 5 13 4
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics based on NHS-III for all Jammu and Kashmir
Urban (n=1081) Rural (n=2200) Jammu (n=1492) Kashmir (n=1789)
Age 30.10 28.15 28.81 28.77
Years of Schooling 8.14 4.48 6.52 4.99
Age 15 to 29 9.43 (n=551) 5.93 (n=1311) 7.55 (n=852) 6.47 (n=1010)
Age > 29 6.80 (n=530) 2.35 (n=889) 5.14 (n=640) 3.08 (n=779)
No Schooling 25.44 % 47.59% 33.38% 46.06%
Years lived at residence 11.78 12.99 12.54 12.74
Married 61.79% 62.55% 74.00% 66.00%
Household size 6.13 7.35 6.23 7.55
Children age < 5 0.45 0.79 0.66 0.68
Hindu 35.25 % 33.27% 72.39% 1.84%
Muslim 60.50% 65.55% 23.53% 97.54%
Working 28.49% 39.73% 19.50% 49.80%
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Table 2.3: Years of schooling for women
Kashmir only
(urban) capital and cities
Model 1 Model 2
War -.512 -.747
(.449) (.604)
Age -.115*** -.113***
(.026) (.026)
Muslim -2.863 -3.072***
( 1.043) (1.172)
Capital 1.395*** 3.654***
( .390) ( .484)
City 4.057*** 6.044***
( 1.238) ( 1.319)
Cohort .777 .532
( .690) ( .705)
Constant yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes
N 1766 1766
R2 0.26 0.23
Notes: Robust standard errros are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 2.4: Robustness checks - Years of schooling - Average Treatment Effects
Kashmir
urban capital and cities
Living > 10 years -.031 -.521
(.469) ( .642)
N 1534 1534
R2 0.30 0.27
Living > 15 years .069 -.338
(.480) (.665)
N 1466 1466
R2 0.30 0.27
Age 15 to 21 -.426 -1.076
(.498) (.664)
N 1298 1298
R2 0.30 0.31
Age 22 to 26 -.651 -1.075
(.675) (.836)
N 1071 1071
R2 0.26 0.26
Age 27 to 29 -.327 .405
( .952) (1.271)
N 933 933
R2 0.21 0.21
Kashmir -.270 -.434
(PSU-based) ( .455) ( .632)
N 1727 1727
R2 0.24 0.21
Notes: Robust standard errros are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.5: School completion rates for primary and secondary schooling
Primary Kashmir only Secondary Kashmir only
Education Education
Model 1 Model 2
War -.149*** War .079
( .047) (.054)
Age -.006* Age -.022***
(.003) ( .005)
Muslim -.028 Muslim .029
( .070) (.073)
Capital -.037*** Capital -.197**
( .072) ( .091)
Cohort -.021 Cohort .085**
( .071) (.037)
Teacher ratios .005 Teacher ratios -.115***
(.006) (.013)
School ratios .003* School ratios -.002***
(.002) ( .000)
Constant yes Constant Yes
Year fixed effects yes Year fixed effects Yes
N 929 N 322
R2 0.05 R2 0.73
Notes: Robust standard errros are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 2.6: School enrollment in primary and secondary schooling
Primary Kashmir only Secondary Kashmir only
Education Education
Model 1 Model 2
War .200*** War -.051
( .091) ( .061)
Age .003 Age -.007
(.002) (.008)
Muslim -.448** Muslim -.088**
( .183) ( .043)
Capital -.037*** Capital -.017
( .072) ( .049)
Cohort .107 Cohort -.099
( .083) ( .121)
Altitude -.095* Altitude .098***
(.056) (.030)
Teachers .015 Teacher .089
per capita ( .024) per capita ( .064)
Schools .906*** School ratios -
per capita (.336)
Constant yes Constant Yes
Year fixed effects yes Year fixed effects Yes
N 932 N 299
R2 0.04 R2 0.08
Notes: I dropped the variable schools per capita in the secondary schooling models because of multicollinearity.
Robust standard errros are reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Chapter 3
Does Trade promote Peace?
- Using a gravity equation
in a n*n dyadic
relationships world
3.1 Introduction
Whether trade reduces the probability of interstate conflict has been the fo-
cus of empirical research for the last 30 years. Although a conclusion has not
been reached, many find that trade indeed reduces conflict (Barbieri 1996, 2003,
Polachek 1980, 1997, 2007, Pollins 1989). Only a few researchers asked if con-
flict reduces trade (Long 2008), or explored both directions of the relationship
(Keshk, Pollins and Reveuny 2004, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008). The si-
multaneity bias inherent in the conflict-trade relationship was ignored by most
researchers or at most dealt with incompletely. My innovation in this paper
is to use the gravity equation to explore the conflict-trade relationship. The
gravity equation is flexible enough to model any dyadic relationship between a
country i and j with regard to trade. It can also be used to model interstate
conflict between two countries (Pollins 1989).
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Within this approach, I deal with three possible limitations in previous work:
the structure of the world, the pooling of data, and endogeneity in the trade
peace nexus. First, the world is modeled as a rectangle to account for the or-
dering introduced in the Correlates of War (COW) country structure.1 In this
world every trade relationship enters the model only once. This ordering in-
cludes more developed countries than less developed countries. More developed
countries tend to be more democratic and more democratic countries tend to be
less likely involved in international conflict. This should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results. When modeling the world as a rectangle, more country
pairs can be used.2 Specifically, my approach covers almost all countries of the
world from 1948 to 2001.
Previous research uses multiple years of data but assumes that dyadic trade
relationships do not change over time. Thus, the data are pooled and treated
much like a cross section of trade dyads. This introduces an omitted variable
bias by ignoring fixed effects common to all country pairs.
The final and arguably most important empirical issue is the simultaneity
bias created by the relationship between trade and conflict. If trade reduces con-
flict and countries in conflict tend not to trade with each other, then na¨ıve esti-
mations could overstate the true reciprocal relationship between trade and con-
flict. To correct for this, an instrumental variable approach is needed. Martin,
Mayer and Thoenig (2008) apply an instrumental variable technique to explain
bilateral trade in their conflict model. They use preferential trade agreements
(PTA) to instrument for bilateral trade. Given that PTAs follow peaceful rela-
tionships between two countries, a weak instrument problem arises.3 My goal
is to provide a stronger instrument to deal with endogeneity. Specifically, I will
1Long (2008) also uses a rectangular world but limits his analysis to a few countries and
years only. Furthermore, he explains trade with conflict.
2Instead of only having n*((n-1)/2) conflict dyads I make use of n*n conflict dyads.
3Another argument is that PTAs could create envy because certain countries are excluded
from them.
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use annual rainfall as an instrument for trade in the conflict model.
The results of the paper suggest that trade and interstate conflicts are recip-
rocal in most specifications, with the results remaining robust in the fixed effect
panel regressions. In using past values of trade in my models, I find that only
last period’s trade values explain current conflict. The trade history between
states has no long-lasting impact on conflict. However, the relationship between
current trade and conflict tends to change direction in using instrumental vari-
able techniques. Trade has a positive effect on conflict. Many international
disputes are actually over trade issues, one example is the dispute over NAFTA
between the USA and Canada in the 1990s. But once focusing only on conflicts
with actual battle deaths, the reciprocal relationship between trade and conflict
prevails even in an instrumental variable model. Overall, trade indeed promotes
peace, which is in favor of the liberal peace hypothesis (Barbieri 1996, 2003).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature
briefly and presents some arguments why trade and conflict affect each other.
Section 3 describes the data and the models. Section 4 focuses on the effects
of trade on conflict. Section 5 covers the robustness checks, while the paper
concludes in section 6.
3.2 The Conflict Trade Nexus
For my purpose, I define conflict as a militarized interstate dispute (MID). A
MID can include threats, the display of force, and battles having fewer than
1,000 deaths (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996).4 Analysis of the conflict trade
nexus originated in the international relations literature.5 In this field there are
two main schools of thought with different implications for the conflict-trade
4This definition does not include wars, due to their rare and idiosyncratic nature.
5International relations is a field in political science explaining how states interact.
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relationship: the liberal view focusing on cooperation and the neorealist view
focusing on power (Barbieri 2003).6
The liberal school assumes that countries seek ways to create peace, which
benefits everyone. The creation of international institutions is one way to
achieve peace by cooperation; an early example is the League of Nations, the
predecessor of the United Nations. In this view, trade can create peace because
countries have to communicate and cooperate to reduce trade barriers, as with
GATT or the WTO. Polachek (1980) formalizes the notion that trade reduces
conflict in a welfare maximization model. In this model, conflict creates welfare
cost because of trade benefits foregone. Governments compare the welfare costs
with possible gains of conflict. Assuming that these welfare costs are higher
than potential conflict gains in the long run, trade reduces conflict and benefits
countries more. This idea has been labeled as the ”liberal peace hypothesis” by
Barbieri (1996, 2003).
The neorealist school assumes that the international system is in anarchy
(Waltz 1979). Countries feel constantly threatened by each other and want to
secure their own power (position), for instance by formal alliances. As long
as power is equally distributed across countries (balance of power), conflict is
minimized because the international system is stabilized. The neorealist view
mainly explains why the Cold War period was more peaceful compared with
previous periods.7 Trade is another way to create stability in the international
system, as long as trade benefits are equally distributed. Once trade benefits are
asymmetrically distributed, conflict arises (Barbieri 1996, 2003). One reason is
that trade gains can be used for national defense which threatens other states
6See Barbieri (2003) for a more detailed discussion of the literature.
7It can also explain why the number of MIDs increased substantially after the end of the
Cold War in 1991 (COW 2010) because there is no balance of power in the international
system anymore.
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(Gowa 1994).8 Another reason is envy (Barbieri 2003).9
These two explanations have each been subject to empirical investigations.
The liberal peace hypothesis is tested by Polachek (1980, 1997, 2007) and Pollins
(1989). Polachek uses trade, defined as exports or imports, as a determinant of
conflict, and finds that trade reduces conflict. Pollins focuses on how interna-
tional cooperation, defined as diplomatic interactions, increases trade. Barbieri
(1996, 2003) and Russet and Oneal (1997, 1999, 2001) test the implications of
the neorealist view. In this light, trade dependencies can increase conflict if one
state depends more on trade than the other. Barbieri defines trade dependency
as interdependency and finds that conflicts increase as a result.11 Russet and
Oneal also find that trade dependency increases conflict.12
Previous researchers have largely focused only on one direction of the conflict-
trade relationship in their work at a time, thereby ignoring endogeneity. Once
both directions are explored in one research design, the issue of simultaneity
becomes salient. Trade reduces conflict, but countries having a history of con-
flict, or currently in conflict, are also less likely to trade. Keshk, Pollins and
Revenue (2004) and Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) explore both directions
of the conflict-trade relationship in their work separately, and recognize endo-
geneity issues between conflict and trade. Keshk, Pollins and Revenue (2004)
apply a two-stage regression to both models without choosing valid instruments
distinguishing their models properly.13 Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) use
8Gowa (1994) uses the term ”security externalities” to describe how trade can create con-
flict.
9In addition to these two schools, Morrow (1999) offers a different explanation that focuses
on firm behavior. He assumes that firms are trading, and the role of countries is, to set up
the framework within which firms can operate effectively.10 A conflict increases transaction
cost by creating trade barriers. For example shipments could be delayed at customs or never
make it to the buyer. A profit maximizing firm will form expectations of the future using past
conflict outcomes. This is because cross-border trade contracts are set in advance. By the
time a conflict occurs, it has no effect on current trade.
11Trade interdependency is defined as the share of a country’s trade on overall trade between
two countries.
12Trade dependency is defined as trade over GDP.
13They leave out the entire discussion about choosing instruments, as well presenting first
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preferential trade agreements (PTA) as an instrument for trade in their conflict
model, and find that the negative relationship between trade and conflict pre-
vails in an IV model. PTA is likely to be a weak instrument because PTAs follow
peaceful relationships between countries. Furthermore, countries excluded from
a PTA can increase their tensions with the excluding country.
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Data
The gravity equation is based on the ”potential concept” from physics (Isard
1954), and first applied empirically to explain trade by Tinbergen (1964).14
Within this framework two objects (e.g. two countries i and j ) attract each
other because of their size (measured as GDP) and their distance.15
The baseline trade gravity equation is :
tradeij = β0GDP
β1
i GDP
β2
j Distance
β3
ij (3.1)
After taking the log of equation (1), and adding a vector of country attributes
(ati,atj) the empirical gravity equation over time t is:
ln(trade)ijt = β0 + β1ln(GDP)it + β2ln(GDP)jt + β3distanceij +
n∑
i=1
γiatit
+
n∑
j=1
γjtatjt + ijt
(3.2)
stage results, and estimate reduced forms of the endogenous equation in the first stage to use
predicted values in the second stage.
14The gravity equation became the standard empirical model in the economics trade liter-
ature, or as Feenstra et al. (2001, p.431) note this model is one of the ”greater success stories
in empirical economics”.
15The same argument can be made for a conflict gravity equation.
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Although the attraction between two countries can be used to describe why
two objects (countries) with similar mass (GDP) trading with each other, it can
also explain why two countries having similar country attributes (e.g. the level
of democracy) are more likely to trade with each other. County attributes enter
the model separately. Furthermore, the gravity equation is flexible enough to
model conflict relationships as well (Pollins 1989) and is used here to explain
(bilateral) conflict as a function of (bilateral) trade. Thus, the conflict gravity
equation takes following empirical form:
conflictijt = β0 + β1ln(trade)ijt + β2ln(GDP)it + β3ln(GDP)jt + β4distanceij
+
n∑
i=1
γiatit +
n∑
j=1
γjtatjt + ijt
(3.3)
In my paper, I follow Head, Mayer and Ries (2010) in modeling the world as
a ”square”. Compared to previous work, I have n*n conflict-trade relationships,
instead of n*((n-1)/2). The latter setup follows the work of Barbieri (1996),
who created a large dataset, covering most countries of the world, based on the
Correlates of War country structure.16 In creating a square world, I account
for a few limitations in this standard setup. First, every trade relationship
enters the model only once, but countries report their trade flows to the IMF.
Quite often, exports reported from one country to another are not the same, if
reported as imports. These discrepancies are the reason why trade relationships
show up twice in a square world.17 Second, the COW-structure (Barbieri 1996)
uses a descending ordering of the world, and includes more dyadic relationships
with developed countries than developing, especially underdeveloped countries.
16This dataset has been widely applied by researchers following her.
17This is the reason why the n*n (-square) world is standard in the trade literature.
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More developed countries are more democratic on the average. Given that more
democratic countries have a tendency to avoid bilateral conflict (Henderson
2002), this structure can bias results. Finally, Barbieri’s dataset misses a few
hundred dyadic relationships for the 1990s. This can add up to a few ten
thousand missing conflict-trade relationships as in Martin, Mayer and Thoenig
(2008).18
I use the dyadic dataset provided by Head, Mayer and Ries (2010) as my
starting point.19 The dataset includes relevant gravity equation variables like
GDP, per capita income (PCI), distance measured as actual distance and conti-
guity (whether countries share a border). Also included are variables describing
similarities between countries (e.g. official language, colonial ties and others). I
add IMF trade data for the period 1948 to 2001 from the historical and current
Direction of Trade Statistics.
My conflict variable is defined as a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID).
MID equals one if a dyad is in an interstate dispute and zero otherwise. Infor-
mation on MID occurrences are from the MID dataset V3.1 (COW 2010) and
the dyadic MID dataset V2 (Maoz 2005). The COW-project also offers informa-
tion on formal military alliances, military expenditures and a national military
capability index (CINC), which can explain interstate conflict. To measure the
level of democracy, I use the Unified Democracy Score (UDS) provided by Pem-
stein, Meserve and Melton (2010). UDS offers more observations for the time
period covered than the standard Polity IV variable. Furthermore, UDS is a
continuous variable, which allows the interpretation of the regression coefficient
as an elasticity.20
18In another version of this paper, I used Barbieri’s dataset and noticed these discrepancies,
which resulted in modeling the world as a rectangle. Note that Barbieri released an updated
version of her dataset in 2012.
19The dataset is available through the CEPII project website: http://www.cepii.fr/
anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm, last accessed 02/20/2012
20Both measurements for democracy behave similarly in my regressions, but I do not report
the Polity IV results here. Results for models using Polity IV can be requested from the
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My complete dataset consists of 50,176 country pairs (or conflict-trade dyads),
which were observed from 1948 to 2001. This results in 2,659,381 observations
and covers 224 countries of the world. Given missing trade data, however, only
around 640,000 observations are used in my typical regressions. I check whether
omitting dyads with no trading relationship affects my results in a robustness
check.21
In observing the same trade dyad over time, I need to account for the panel
structure to avoid an omitted variable bias by ignoring unobserved fixed effects
common to every dyad. Here, I apply fixed effects panel models, and compare
them to the underlying pooled models. Green, Kim and Yoon (2001) apply a
fixed effects logit model to a smaller subset of countries and years, and find no
relationship between trade and conflict. Similarly, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig
(2008) apply fixed effects logit regressions and linear probability fixed effects
regressions to explain conflict, and find a tendency that the reciprocal relation-
ship between conflict and trade prevails. To be consistent with previous work,
I show results for population-average based GEE models as well.
Lastly, I deal with endogeneity in the conflict-trade relationship by using an
instrumental variable approach, which is described in more detail below.
3.4 Does trade affect conflict?
Na¨ıve Regressions
My results for the baseline conflict gravity equation are summarized in Table
3.1. Because of the binary nature of the bilateral conflict variable, I use non-
linear estimation techniques. I present results for a logit model, a fixed effects
author.
21Another issue with trade data is taking the log of zero. I use total trade in millions of
dollars and add one dollar to each observation. Finally, trade (exports plus imports), GDP
and PCI are measured in 2005 constant USD.
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(also known as conditional) logit model (FE logit) and a population average
logit model (PA logit) to be consistent with the existing literature.
The coefficients in the pooled logit and population average model behave
similar in sign and significance. In both setups trade has a strong and highly
significant negative effect on bilateral conflict. Trade indeed promotes peace,
which is in favor of the liberal peace hypothesis.
Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) stress the importance of economic variables, like
GDP (or GDP growth) in explaining conflict. Here, GDP and per capita in-
come (PCI) have significant effects on bilateral conflict. Countries bigger in
size (measured as GDP) are more likely to be involved in conflict.22 Wealthier
countries (PCI) are less likely to be involved in conflict.
The distance measurements have the expected signs. Countries further away
from each other are less likely to be in conflict, while countries sharing a border
are more likely to be in conflict. Given that MIDs are defined as bilateral
conflict, this result is not unexpected, because most (armed) conflicts are indeed
between neighbors.
Measurements describing similarities between countries include sharing an
official language or a common history (as a former colony and colonizer). These
measurements increase the potential for conflict. Many countries having an in-
terstate conflict also share a common language; examples include China and
Taiwan. Furthermore, Africa has many examples where former colonies fought
for their independence from their mother countries. Another measurement of
similarity is sharing the same legal system. Sharing the same legal system
decreases conflict potentials, which can be explained by having similar institu-
tional systems and systems in place to solve disputes (e.g. WTO or EU dispute
settlement procedures).
22Part of GDP are military expenditures, which tend to rise with GDP (Payne and Sahu
1993). I tested, but do not report, the role of military expenditures on conflict and find, that
once included, GDP becomes insignificant and changes sign.
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Surprisingly, being in a formal military alliance or being more military ca-
pable (CINC) have no explanatory power. Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) find that
economic variables are in some cases more important in explaining conflict (in
general) than standard international relations measurements. Though, once I
focus on MIDs including actual battle deaths in a robustness check, CINC de-
ters conflict. Countries with more military capabilities can do more harm in
a dispute escalating to skirmishes or battles. However, the standard interna-
tional relations variable to explain conflict is the level of democracy. Democracy
has the expected negative impact on MID. Countries more democratic are less
likely to be involved in bilateral conflict. Countries more democratic tend to
be less involved in conflict and find other (and likely better) channels to solve
disputes.23
The fixed effects logit model is different from the underlying pooled logit
models. Changes in conflict outcomes are explained; for instance if two coun-
tries were in conflict last year, but not this year, they enter the model, while
country pairs having the same conflict outcomes in two consecutive periods do
not enter the model.24 The negative effect of trade on conflict remains signifi-
cant in a fixed effects model. The liberal peace hypothesis holds after accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity over time of conflict dyads. Finally, gravity vari-
ables like GDP and PCI have the same explanatory power as before. Combined
with democracy and trade, these variables explain changes in conflict outcomes
significantly. This confirms the finding of Green, Kim and Yoon (2001) that
economic and international relations variables keep their explanatory power in
fixed effects setups.25
23For instance the ”Dispute Settlement Understanding” of the WTO is a well established
mechanism.
24This explains why the sample size reduces substantially, because only dyads with observed
changes in conflict are included in the regression.
25They apply their fixed effects models to the Barbieri country structure.
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[Table 3.1 about here]
Dynamics - Lags of Trade
Here, I can answer the question whether the trade history between countries
matters in explaining bilateral conflict.26 I use ten lags of trade, but only
report the first five lags in Table 3.2 to conserve space.
Only last period’s trade levels explain current conflict. Governments act
short-sighted when an interstate conflict occurs and do not account for (positive)
past trade relationships. A similar example can be found in Head et al. (2010).
They find that former colonies, after breaking away from their motherlands,
start trading again with each other only a few years later. Given that movements
for independence initiated decolonization, the conflict is soon forgotten.
Overall, the models behave similar compared to above. Recognizing that
current trade is endogenous in the na¨ıve regressions, most variables remain sim-
ilar in sign and significance once current trade is excluded from the model. Only
the military capability index (CINC) changes from being insignificant to signif-
icant. CINC can deter bilateral conflict in this setup.
[Table 3.2 about here]
Instrumental Variable Models
If trade reduces conflict (liberal peace hypothesis) and countries in conflict never
(or barely) trade with each other, then current trade is endogenous in my mod-
els.27 My above results are likely to overstate the negative relationship between
26Another question could be if countries (or their governments) form expectations of future
trade levels in using leads. Using leads in my models does not give a consistent picture.
Basically, the significance of leads is cumbersome to explain, e.g. why should the third or
seventh period ahead matter, but not the first or second.
27Barbieri and Levy (1999) find that if the conflict (even war) is short (less than a year)
trade levels between countries do not decrease necessarily.
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trade and conflict. Here, I suggest rainfall as an instrument for trade. Rainfall
matters for many countries in affecting economic outcomes (Miguel, Satyanath
and Sergenti Ernest 2004). If a country experiences a drought, it needs to im-
port agricultural goods. Similarly, if a country has adequate amounts of rain, it
can export agricultural goods (or goods related to primary goods). Aldaya et
al. (2012) show for the US that rainfall shocks change patterns in international
crop trade. Moreover, water in general is used for production and not only
needed in agriculture. I use annual rainfall data from the Tyndall Centre for
Climate Change Research. These data is available from 1960 to 2000 only.
In Table 3.3, I present results for a pooled instrumental variable model
(IV-Probit) and a linear probability model (IV-LPM). The first stage results
are expected for standard trade gravity equations. GDP, PCI and countries
sharing a common language trade more with each other. The instrumental
variable rainfall performs well in the first stage with an F(2,547195)=419.01,
which is above the suggested value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997, Stock and Yogo
2005). Furthermore, with two instruments available to explain one endogenous
regressor the model is overidentified. Rainfall increases trade between countries
and is highly significant in the first stage. However, a weak instrumental variable
can still arise in large samples which should be kept in mind while interpreting
the results (Staiger and Stock 1997).
The second stage results are mixed. Trade still decreases conflict in the
probit setup, but reverses in sign in the linear probability model. Many MIDs
are over trade issues (or economic issues in general), which can explain the
positive effect of trade in the LPM setup. Once focusing on conflicts with actual
battle deaths in a robustness check, the negative relationship prevails even in
the LPM setup. The economic costs of conflict (e.g. trade benefits foregone and
human lives lost) are too high compared to the benefits from just trading with
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each other.
In the instrumental variable models, most explanatory variables remain sim-
ilar in sign and significance compared to the na¨ıve regressions. A noteworthy
exemption is alliance, which was insignificant before. Here, military alliances
have the expected negative effect in reducing conflict.
Overall, trade can have a positive effect on conflict, but also a negative ef-
fect, which remains (mostly) negative in a series of robustness checks.
[Table 3.3 about here]
3.5 Robustness checks
I perform four robustness checks. First, I test whether focusing on MIDs having
actual battle deaths changes the results. The economic costs are high if skir-
mishes or battles occur. Thus, I expect the relationship between trade and con-
flict to be stronger in this setup. Second, researchers argue that the democratic
peace hypothesis is an artifact of the Cold War (Barbieri 1996, Henderson 2002).
I limit the sample to the Post-Cold War period. Third, I deal with missing val-
ues differently by assuming them to be zero. Including these trade relationships
increases the sample size substantially. Finally, I split up the sample by regions
to see if country pairs in certain regions of the world are more or less likely to
be involved in conflict.
The results are summarized in Table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. I limit my analysis
to current variables. To conserve space, I only report coefficients of the trade
variable for my last three robustness checks (Table 3.5 and 3.6).28
Changing the conflict variable to only MIDs having actual battle deaths
shows a stronger negative relationship between trade and conflict (Table 3.4).
28Results for other control variables can be requested from the author.
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This is expected, because the costs of escalating conflicts to battles are higher
compared to regular disputes. The negative relationship also holds in the in-
strumental variable setup. Most control variables have the same sign and signif-
icances as before. Two exemptions are alliance and CINC. Both were insignifi-
cant in the broader definition of conflict. Here, they have the expected negative
impact on conflict in the pooled setup. Alliances are mostly non-aggression
treaties (type 3), which do deter violent conflicts. Furthermore, countries with
more military capabilities can also do more harm. In this light, CINC deters
MIDs from escalating to battles.29
Barbieri (1996, 2003) argues that the liberal peace hypothesis is an artifact of
the Cold War period. After 1991, globalization increased and countries opened
up to more trade (e.g. NAFTA and the expansion of the EU), which can change
the effect of trade on conflict because trade benefits can outweigh potential gains
from conflict. I find that the positive relationship between trade and conflict
is stronger in the IV models (Table 3.5) compared to above. Trade increased
bilateral conflict during the Post-Cold War period, as found by Barbieri (2003)
in a different setup.
The IMF trade statistics include many missing values for trade relationships
which are unlikely to have any significant amount of trade. Although it is re-
ported as missing or not available, trade is likely to be zero; for instance Israel
does not trade with its neighboring countries for obvious political reasons, but
trade is not coded as zero. I treat missing values as zero, which increases the
sample size by more than 200,000 observations. In Table 3.5, I find similar
results as in my na¨ıve and IV-models above. The relationship between trade
and conflict is stronger in this setup compared to my results above.
[Table 3.4 and 3.5 about here]
29Recall, that the definition of an MID includes the display of power as well.
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Finally, I divide my sample into regions and focus only on conflict relation-
ships within a certain region (Table 3.6). I find similar results as above. The
negative relationship between trade and peace holds for most regions of the
world. Only for highly integrated regions like Europe, I find that trade can
increase conflict potentials. Given that MIDs can also be on trade issues this
finding is not unexpected when countries heavily trade with each other. The
more countries trade the more likely it is that trade issues occur.
[Table 3.6 about here]
3.6 Conclusion
The discussion how (and if) trade and interstate conflict are related has pro-
duced countless research over the last 30 years (Barbieri 1996, 2003, Polachek
1980, 1997, 2007, Pollins 1989, Keshk, Pollins and Reveuny 2004, Long 2008,
Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008). The overall tendency is that trade reduces
conflict (known as the liberal peace hypothesis). Barbieri (1996, 2003) contests
this idea in her work and finds that trade can actually increase bilateral conflict.
I find that the negative relationship between trade and conflict holds in most
of my setups in changing the structure of the world to the standard structure
in international economics. Trade indeed promotes peace. Thus, welfare gains
from trade do outweigh potential gains from bilateral conflict (Polachek 1980).
This includes pooled models and models accounting for the panel structure
of the data. After accounting for endogeneity between trade and conflict, I
find that trade can increase conflict, mainly because of disputes based on trade-
related issues. However, once I focus on conflicts having fatalities, the reciprocal
relationship between trade and conflict even holds in an instrumental variable
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model. The cost of escalating a conflict to skirmishes or battles are too high, in
terms of trade benefits foregone.
Overall, the reciprocal relationship between trade and conflict holds in a
square world. Trade does indeed promote peace because potential gains from
trade outweigh potential gains from conflict.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Conflict gravity equation - 1948 to 2001
Logit FE-Logit PA-Logit
Tradeij -.019*** -.031*** -.014***
( .007) (.004) ( .005)
GDPi .457*** .363*** .415***
(.042) ( .129) (.023)
GDPj .516*** .231* .500***
(.041) ( .128) (.021)
PCIi -.289*** -.544*** -.311***
( .046) (.133) ( .033)
PCIj -.440*** -.442*** -.600***
( .053) (.133) ( .033)
Distij -.854*** - -.957***
( .070) ( .040)
Contigij 1.806*** - 1.619***
( .164) ( .098)
Languageij .388*** - .320***
(.137) ( .082)
Allianceij -.159 -.195 .084
(.151) (.131) (.085)
Colonyij .951*** - .958***
(.215) ( .108)
Legalij -.223* - -.204***
(.116) (.074)
Coldwarij .500*** .031 .352***
( .160) (.076) ( .076)
Democi -.748*** -.847*** -.160
(.165) ( .150) ( .120)
Democj -1.076*** -.620*** -1.083***
( .177) ( .149) ( .115)
Cinci -.015 .515 -.043
( .057) (.773) (.066)
Cincj .004 .083 .012
( .056) ( .132) ( .075)
Time fixed effects: yes no no
n 617218 27191 490169
Pseudo R2 0.27 n.a. n.a.
Notes: I use clustered standard errors where available (reported in brackets). The FE-Logit explains only dyads
with observed changes in conflict outcomes between two periods. This is why the sample reduces significantly.
The population average model assume an AR-(1) link within groups. All continous measurements are in log-form.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.2: Conflict gravity equation - 1948 to 2001 - Lags of Trade
Logit FE-Logit PA-Logit
L1.Tradeij -.037*** -.027*** -.025***
(.008) (.009) ( .009)
L2.Tradeij .005 .009 .007
(.007) (.010) (.009)
L3.Tradeij -.001 .001 -.000
( .009) (.010) ( .009)
L4.Tradeij .011 .017 .008
(.008) ( .010) (.009)
L5.Tradeij -.000 .000 -.004
(.007) (.010) (.009)
GDPi .442*** .099 .428***
(.052) ( .198) (.027)
GDPj .484*** .739*** .493***
(.049) ( .192) ( .025)
PCIi -.308*** -.424** -.331***
(.052) (.193) ( .036)
PCIj -.461*** -.765*** -.512***
( .057) ( .191) ( .036)
Distij -.847*** - -.895***
(.081) (.044)
Contigij 1.796*** - 1.711***
( .180) ( .110)
Languageij .320** - .319***
( .155) ( .094)
Allianceij -.072 -.352** -.064
( .165) (.171) (.097)
Colonyij .970*** - .949***
( .254) ( .125)
Legalij -.170 - -.278***
( .130) (.084)
Coldwarij .460*** -.001 .081
(.167) (.091) (.079)
Democi -.785*** -1.020*** -.473***
(.180) ( .185) ( .130)
Democj -1.216*** -.571*** -.962***
( .194) (.184) ( .124)
Cinci -.085** 11.118** -.073
( .039) (5.534) ( .097)
Cincj -.063* .598 -.064
( .037) (1.138) ( .152)
Time fixed effects: yes no no
n 438715 17695 401586
R2 0.27 n.a. n.a.
Notes: Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. The FE-Logit explains only dyads with observed
changes in conflict outcomes between two periods. This is why the sample reduces significantly. This can
introduce problems of multicollinearity (e.g. with CINC). The population average model assume an AR-(1) link
within groups. All continous measurements are in log-form.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.3: Dealing with Endogeneity - 1960 to 2000 - IV regressions
First Stage IV-Probit IV-LPM
GPDi 1.537*** 1.537***
(.004) ( .004)
GDPj 1.625*** 1.625***
(.004) (.004)
PCIi .272*** .272***
(.007) ( .007)
PCIj .230*** .230***
(.008) (.008)
Distij -2.413*** -2.413***
( .012) (.012)
Contigij .397*** .397***
(.054) ( .054)
Languageij 1.484*** 1.484***
( .023) ( .023)
Allianceij -.312*** -.312***
(.031) ( .031)
Colonyij 1.883*** 1.883***
(.058) ( .058)
Legalij .101*** .101***
(.017) (.017)
Coldwarij -.902*** -.335***
(.063) ( .066)
Democi 3.257*** 3.257***
(.031) (.031)
Democj 1.914 1.914***
(.031) (.031)
Cinci .065*** .065***
( .021) (.021)
Cincj .021 .021
(.022) ( .022)
Raini .153*** .153***
(.010) (.010)
Rainj .258*** .258***
(.010) (.010)
F-Stat 419.01 419.01
Second Stage
Tradeij -.074** .0012***
(.035) (.00039)
GPDi .287*** -.0004
( .055) ( .00060)
GDPj .312*** -.0003
( .058) ( .00064)
PCIi -.096*** -.0010***
( .011) (.00012)
PCIj -.146*** -.0013***
(.010) (.00010)
Distij -.514*** -.0012
( .086) ( .00093)
Contigij .810*** .0693***
( .030) ( .00065)
Languageij .241*** -.0013**
( .056) ( .00064)
Allianceij -.110*** -.0043***
(.026) (.00036)
Colonyij .531*** .0097***
(.074) ( .0010)
Legalij -.093*** -.0015***
( .020) ( .00020)
Coldwarij .126 .0026***
(.078) (.00077)
Democi -.061 -.0059***
(.128) ( .00141)
Democj -.248*** -.0059***
( .086) ( .00096)
Cinci -.009 -.0001***
( .033) ( .00024)
Cincj -.004 -.0000
( .031) ( .00025)
Time fixed effects: yes yes
n 547263 547263
R2 0.49 0.02
Notes: For the IV-Probit, I get a Wald χ21=3.65 with p=0.056 for the exogeneity of the instruments. For the
IV-LPM model, I get an Anderson χ2=837.49 with p=0.00 and a Sargan statistic of χ21=12.904 with p=0.0003.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.4: Robustness check I - Fatal MIDs - 1948 to 2001
Logit FE-Logit PA-Logit IV-Probit IV-LPM
Tradeij -.047*** -.037*** -.042*** -.346*** -.00059***
(.011) ( .007) ( .007) (.063) (.00020)
GDPi .411*** .289 .380*** .665*** .0012***
(.067) ( .284) ( .036) (.098) (.00032)
GDPj .552*** -.492* .551*** .746*** .0014***
(.068) ( .294) (.033) ( .103) (.00033)
PCIi -.291*** -.727*** -.405*** -.042** -.0002***
(.101) (.291) (.053) ( .021) (.00006)
PCIj -.703*** .182 -.958*** -.199*** -.00055***
( .117) ( .305) ( .057) (.018) ( .00005)
Distij -.821*** - -.937*** -1.104*** -.0024***
(.110) (.058) (.154) ( .00049)
Contigij 2.391*** - 1.887*** .996*** .0246***
(.276) (.158) (.055) (.00034)
Languageij .568** - .551*** .738*** .0015***
( .253) ( .127) ( .099) (.0003)
Allianceij -.501** -.443 -.220 -.284*** -.0030***
(.232) (.276) ( .151) (.050) ( .00019)
Colonyij .997** - 1.367*** 1.089*** .0042***
( .335) ( .166) ( .132) ( .00053)
Legalij -.474** - -.566*** -.159*** -.0006***
( .220) (.121) (.036) ( .00010)
Coldwarij .654* .334** .999*** -.005 .00503***
( .377) ( .170) ( .144) (.146) (.00075)
Democi -.336 -.428 .790*** 1.039*** .0022***
(.283) ( .300) ( .216) (.228) ( .00074)
Democj -.772** -.721** -.503** .446*** .0008*
( .337) ( .307) (.202) ( .152) ( .00050)
CINCi -.179** 33.650*** -.249 -.030 -.0000
( .091) (7.555) (.244) (.087) ( .00012)
CINCj -.140* -1.506 -.083 -.022 -.0000
(.074) ( 7.990) (.228) ( .078) ( .00013)
IV:Raini .153*** .153***
( .010) (.010)
IV:Rainj .258*** .258***
( .010) ( .010)
F-Stat 419.01 419.01
Time fixed effects: yes no no yes yes
n 617218 9192 490169 547263 547263
R2 0.32 n.a n.a. 0.48 0.48
Notes: These models only includes MIDs with at least one battle death. Clustered standard errors are reported in
brackets.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.5: Robustness checks II - Post-Cold War period and Missing Trade
Values
Pooled Logit FE-Logit PA-Logit IV-Probit IV-LPM
Post-Cold War period
Tradeij -.028** .003 -.004 .194*** .0030***
( .014) (.018) (.012) ( .050) (.0004)
n 189200 2256 183512 145934 145934
R2 0.31 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.03
using missing values
Tradeij -.035*** -.046*** -.023*** -.138*** .0024***
( .005) (.076) ( .003) ( .045) ( .0005)
n 918450 38913 844523 782086 782086
R2 0.28 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.02
Notes: The models using rainfall cover the period 1960 to 2000. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6: Robustness checks III - Different regions
Pooled Logit FE-Logit PA-Logit IV-Probit IV-LPM
East Asia / Pacific
Tradeij -.035** -.042** -.038*** -.127*** -.0097***
( .015) ( .019) ( .014) ( .039) ( .0018)
n 8411 1600 6442 8411 8606
R2 0.37 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.11
Central Asia
Tradeij -.081*** -.029 -.115*** -.382 -.00022
( .031) ( .028) (.016) ( .270) ( .00064)
n 19071 1117 28591 9819 27866
R2 0.41 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.03
Latin America / Caribbean
Tradeij -.039* -.027* -.027* -.073 -.0017
( .022) ( .015) (.014) ( .090) ( .0015)
n 48718 3751 38986 38345 38345
R2 0.34 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.08
Middle East / North Africa
Tradeij -.084*** -.067*** -.063*** -.056 .0071***
( .013) ( .012) ( .015) ( .108) ( .0013)
n 54580 3501 43176 49104 50698
R2 0.38 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.27
North America
Tradeij .002 -.022 -.024 -.045 -.0012**
( .018) (.021) ( .141) ( .0005) ( .00058)
n 60994 2592 50073 50073 59498
R2 0.44 n.a. n.a. 0.02 0.03
South Asia
Tradeij -.014 -.030 .063* -.214 -.0079***
( .033) (.028) ( .0005) ( .172) ( .0024)
n 32544 3102 30542 30542 31704
R2 0.43 n.a. n.a. 0.02 0.04
Africa
Tradeij -.004 -.0029 .0032 -.038 -.0015
( .016) ( .012) ( .014) ( .122) ( .0017)
n 47101 3171 36245 45104 46462
R2 0.34 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.04
Europe
Tradeij .364** -1.578 .301 -1.501*** -.013***
( .174) (1.156) (.283) ( .633) ( .0045)
n 10605 748 10794 10356 11820
R2 0.07 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.13
Notes: Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. Regions follow the World Bank definition and are for
trade between countries in the same region.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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